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VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORP. V. NATURAL
RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.: RESPONSE
AND REACTION IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Alfred S. Neely, IVt*

In Vermont Yankee, The United States Supreme Court established a paradigm for judicial review of administrative agencies' rulemaking actions. The Court held that Congress had
established the maximum procedures that may be required of an
agency undertaking informal rulemaking. These procedural requirements were established by section 553 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, and courts generally are prohibited from imposing additional procedures upon agencies. Since the 1978 opinion
was handed down, the lower federal judiciary has been exploring
the possible implications of the Vermont Yankee rule. The author surveys the lower court opinions, and concludes that this
lower court exploration has produced two results. First, lower
courts can sidestep Vermont Yankee in three ways: by use of
their power to substantively review the rulemaking record, by refusing to accept agencies' characterization of some rules as exempt from the notice and comment requirements of section 553
of the Administrative Procedure Act, and by developing the "constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances"
exception which the Court explicitly created in Vermont Yankee. The author calls upon the Supreme Court to close these
paths of escape from the Vermont Yankee mandate by acting to
more finely develop the precise nature of the judiciary's role in
the review of informal rulemaking. Second, the author notes
that the lower federal judiciary has improperly extended application of Vermont Yankee to review of agency adjudication, and
asks the Court to clarify its stand on the relationship between
Vermont Yankee and administrative action beyond the sphere of
administrative rulemaking.
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INTRODUCTION

I.

In 1978, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its opinion
in the case of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. 1 The Court's decision reversed two prior rulings of
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,2 triggered extensive commentary in the legal literature, 3 and apparently declared an
end to a species of judicial activism in the review of agency rulemaking. 4
Vermont Yankee was immediately recognized as an important case with
at least prospects of significant impact. 5
The purpose of this article is to consider the response and reaction
of the lower federal judiciary to Vermont Yankee. Today, six years after
the Court's decision, sufficient time has passed to discern something
about the nature and quality of that response and reaction. This in turn
affords the opportunity to assess the efficacy of the Court's leadership in
judicial review of administrative rulemaking.

II.

VERMONT YANKEE

A.

The Decision

Vermont Yankee arose out of the technically complex and politically
volatile issue of licensing nuclear power facilities. The corporation had
successfully obtained the requisite construction and operating licenses
from the Atomic Energy Commission (Commission);6 in granting the
licenses the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board had refused to consider
1. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
2. Aeschliman v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir.
1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
3. See generally infra text accompanying notes 23-40.
4. See generally infra text accompanying notes 6-22.
5. The number of casebooks in administrative law which now include Vermont Yankee
provides some evidence of consensus on the significance of the case. See, e.g., S.
BREYER & R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 51622 (1979); W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 192-201
(7th ed. 1979); J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN
PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 53-61 (Supp. 1980); D. ROTHSCHILD & C. KOCH, FUNDAMENTALS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 372-78 (1981); B.
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 289-95 (2d ed. 1983).
6. In 1974 the licensing and other regulatory activities of the Atomic Energy Commission were transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233.

258

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 14

issues pertaining to the spent fuel cycle, and specifically, fuel reprocessing and disposal of reprocessing wastes. The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) objected to this; however, the Atomic Safety and
Licensing Appeal Board, the administrative appellate tribunal with the
responsibility for reviewing the initial decision, affirmed the grant of
license. 7
Nevertheless, the Commission did not ignore the issue of spent fuel
disposal. Shortly after the decision concerning Vermont Yankee's license, it initiated a rulemaking proceeding to consider the subject. 8 It is
noteworthy that in this proceeding the Commission did not limit procedural opportunities to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA).9 Under the APA, informal rulemaking is required to be
conducted in accordance with certain basic and relatively simple procedural requirements. The statute provides that "[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register . . . " and
that "the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation."IO Furthermore, it requires that "[a]fter consideration of the relevant matter
presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise
general statement of their basis and purpose."ll The nature of this procedural pathway has resulted in its characterization as "notice-and-comment" rulemaking.
These were the basic procedural requirements that the Commission
elected to exceed in its spent fuel disposal rulemaking proceeding.
Although not required, the Commission held a hearing. In advance of
the hearing it made certain background documents available to the public, and announced that participants would be given a reasonable opportunity to present their positions and, time permitting, oral as well as
written statements. In addition, it indicated that a transcript would be
available and that the record would be open for a thirty day period for
filing of supplemental statements. 12 In these and other respects, the procedural opportunities afforded interested persons went far beyond the
provisions of the AP A.
Nonetheless, there was dissatisfaction with the procedures employed
because the Commission had refused the request of the NRDC that adjudicatory procedures be utilized, and especially the request that cross-examination and discovery be allowed.13 Consequently, the NRDC turned
7. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 526-28 (1978).
8. [d. at 528-30.
9. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706 (1982).
10. [d. § 553 (a)-(c).
11. [d. § 553(c).
12. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 528-30 (1978).
13. [d. at 529.
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to the judiciary for review of the Commission's rulemaking procedure as
well as other issues surrounding the licensing of the Vermont Yankee
facility.
In 1976, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
decided whether the rulemaking procedures used were legitimate and adequate. 14 The court concluded that the proceeding was procedurally defective, notwithstanding compliance with the basic requirements of the
AP A, and remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceeding. ls The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the
court of appeals's decision. The Court was motivated by its "concern
that they had seriously misread or misapplied . . . statutory and decisional law cautioning reviewing courts against engrafting their own notions of proper procedures upon agencies entrusted with substantive
functions by Congress."16 The lower court's determination of the inadequacy of the Commission's rulemaking procedures violated the Supreme
Court's perception of basic principles governing the relationship between
administrative agencies and the jUdiciary. It noted:
Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the
exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally
not free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant
them. This is not to say necessarily that there are no circumstances which would ever justify a court in overturning agency
action because of a failure to employ procedures beyond those
required by the [APA]. But such circumstances, if they exist,
are extremely rare. 17
Consequently, the Court rejected the NRDC's contention that the procedural requirements of the AP A for informal rulemaking constitute only
"lower procedural bounds" which a court may require an agency to go
beyond "when an agency's proposed rule addresses complex or technical
factual issues or 'Issues of Great Public Import'."ls
In reaching this conclusion, the Court was not suggesting that lower
courts were to do nothing in the control of administrative rulemaking.
Among other things, there remained the matter "of whether the chal14. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
15. Whether the court of appeals mandated additional procedures beyond those required by § 553 of the APA is open to debate. The Supreme Court found that it
had, noting "we conclude that while the matter is not entirely free from doubt, the
majority of the court of appeals struck down the rule because of the perceived inadequacies of the procedures employed in the rulemaking proceedings." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
540-41 (1978).
16. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978).
17. [d. at 524.
18. [d. at 545.
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lenged rule finds sufficient justification in the administrative proceedings
that it should be upheld by the reviewing court,"19 subject to the
Supreme Court's warning that the lower courts should "not stray beyond
the judicial province to explore the procedural format or to impose upon
the agency its own notion of which procedures are 'best' or most likely to
further some vague, undefined public good. "20
The relative clarity of the Court's pronouncement was nevertheless
clouded by its suggestion that there might be circumstances in which a
court could insist on added procedures in informal rulemaking, and the
ambiguity of the suggestion itself created further uncertainty.
In prior opinions we have intimated that even in a rulemaking
proceeding when an agency is making a 'quasi-judicial' determination by which a very small number of persons are 'exceptionally affected, in each case upon individual grounds,' in some
circumstances additional procedures may be required in order
to afford the aggrieved individuals due process. . . . It might
also be true, although we do not think the issue is presented in
this case and accordingly do not decide it, that a totally unjustified departure from well-settled agency procedures of long
standing might require judicial correction.21
Yet the Court definitely had infrequent exceptions in mind, for it noted
that "[t]his much is absolutely clear: Absent constitutional constraints
or extremely compelling circumstances the 'administrative agencies
should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure and to pursue
methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties.' "22
B.

Scholarly Reaction

Legal commentary on Vermont Yankee appeared soon after the
Supreme Court's decision. These writings represent part of the intellectual climate in which the responses and reactions of the lower federal
courts to Vermont Yankee have unfolded. They provide an indication of
perceptions of the case, its meaning and significance, its desirability and
its possible, if not probable, impact.
An early and important symposium, Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Three Perspectives,23 appeared in the Harvard Law Review in June, 1978. In it, Professors Stewart, Byse, and Breyer of the Harvard Law School presented
their reactions to the decision.
19. [d. at 549.
20. [d.
21. [d. at 542 (footnote omitted) (quoting FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S.
134, 143 (1939».
22. [d.
23. Vennonf Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.:
Three Perspectives, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1804 (1978).
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Professor Stewart was unenthusiastic about the result: "[T]he Court
announced the broad, novel, and important principle that federal courts
may not, absent extraordinary circumstances, require federal administrative agencies to employ procedural formalities beyond those specified in
the Administrative Procedure Act . . . or other relevant statutes. This
principle is unsound."24 This conclusion was founded on the view that
the prohibition of "innovative judicial imposition of procedural requirements beyond those specified by the APA . . . "25 drew upon an antiquated view of developments in administrative law. Thus, he observed
that "Vermont Yankee is myopic in denying courts an adequate role in
adjusting and updating the law, and instead leaving the entire responsibility to Congress and administrators. "26
Professor Stewart did indicate, nevertheless, that there was a basis
for mitigation of the adverse implications of the decision. First, he suggested that the "ban on procedural innovation by courts should be read
as limited to the particular circumstances of generic rulemaking in nuclear power regulation, while its rebuking tone should be read more
broadly to warn lower federal courts against going too far in using novel,
ad hoc procedural requirements to force reconsideration of agency policies which judges view as questionable. "27 Furthermore, he thought that
"the practical effect. . . will be to stimulate continued use of more moderate forms of hybrid procedure" because of the continuing requirement
of an adequate record for purposes of judicial review,28 with the additional possibility of "the salutary side effect of leading reviewing courts to
engage in more open and explicit scrutiny of substantive agency policies,
rather than resorting to indirect procedural devices to control
outcomes. "29
In contrast, Professor Byse saw the case as "a needed corrective to
an unwholesome trend in the lower federal courtS."30 His support for the
decision was "powerfully influenced by [his] conception of the respective
institutional roles and responsibilities of the judiciary, the legislature and
the administrative . . . . "31 Professor Breyer was similarly supportive of
the decision. His principal point of disagreement was with the Court's
remand of the case; he believed that the Court need not have done anything more than affirm the Commission's decision. 32
24. Stewart, Vermont Yankee And The Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1805, 1805 (1978).
25. Id. at 1811.
26. Id. at 1820.
27. Id. at 1821.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Byse, Vermont Yankee And The Evolution ofAdministrative Procedure: A Somewhat
Different View, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1823, 1823 (1978).
31. Id. at 1930.
32. Breyer, Vermont Yankee And the Courts' Role In The Nuclear Energy Controversy,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1840 (1978).
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The ultimate issue presented by Vermont Yankee is the proper
role of the courts in the debate over nuclear power. Since that
debate has been lively and effective in the political arena, and
since one cannot reasonably argue that important health,
safety, or environmental interests lie on only one side of that
debate, the courts. . . should play a limited role, affecting as
little as possible the outcome of that debate. 33
Perhaps the most vehement criticism of Vermont Yankee has come from
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis. He observed that" 'the Vermont Yankee
opinion is largely one of those rare opinions in which a unanimous
Supreme Court speaks with little or no authority.' "34 In his judgment
"the main thrust of the opinion is to outlaw new common law that adds
to the procedural requirements of section 553 of the APA,"35 and this
runs counter to the reality that most administrative law is judge made
and ignores a common law that has developed in harmony with the intent and terms of the AP A. 36 His concerns, however, were alleviated by
his prediction that the principles of Vermont Yankee would prove
shortlived. 37
Numerous others have commented on the case. Their views are as
varied as those of the commentators just discussed, and generalization
concerning them is somewhat hazardous without full development of
their opinions. Nevertheless, some patterns of perception of the case do
emerge.
Many consider Vermont Yankee an important constraint on the
ability of courts to impose procedural requirements in rulemaking beyond those established by Congress in the AP A, and its importance is
underscored by the judgment that the broad principles of the opinion
transcend the ambiguities of the possible exceptions which it created. 38
33. Id. at 1845.
34. Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 UTAH
L. REV. 3, 17 (quoting K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:37, at
616 (2d ed. 1978».
35. Davis, supra note 34, at 10.
36. Id. at 3, 12.
37. Id. at 3, 13-16; see Friendly, Book Review, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 471, 480-83 (1980)
(reviewing K. C. DAVIS, 1 & 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1979».
38. See, e.g., Bain, Informal Rulemaking: In Quest of Nuclear Licensing Reform, 55
DEN. L. J. 177, 179,209 (1978) (exceptional circumstances justifying courts' imposition of additional procedures on agencies are rare, especially in nuclear regulatory
context); Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV.
393,422 (1981) (a "broadside at the procedural creativity of lower federal courts in
rulemaking cases."); Estreicher, Pragmatic Justice: The Contribution of Judge Harold Leventhal to Administrative Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 894,907 (1980) (the case
"moots the Bazelon-Leventhal debate by holding the courts enjoy no common law
authority to prescribe procedures, in addition to those required by the Constitution
or applicable statutes, in the interest of etfectivejudicial review."); Hahn, Procedural
Adequacy in Administrative Decisionmaking: A Unified Formulation, 30 AD. L.
REV. 467; 491-92 (1978) (the case "redirects the current of development and possibly terminates judicial development of the law altogether. "); McGarity, Substantive
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Naturally this view assumes an obedient and willing lower federal judiciary.39 Ot!J.ers have been more inclined to discount the ultimate signifiand Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions:
Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. L. J. 729, 752 (1979) ("The
Court rejected Judge Bazelon's 'good procedures ensure good substance' approach
and implicitly favored Judge Leventhal's more activist 'hard look' approach.");
Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D. C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978
SUP. Cr. REV. 345, 395-96 ("It would go too far, however, to suggest that Vermont
Yankee is anything less than a major watershed. It has put to rest the notion that
the courts have a continuing 'common-law' authority to impose procedures not required by the Constitution in the areas covered by the AP A. In that sense, at least,
'hybrid rule making,' under the APA is dead."); Schwartz, Administrative Law
Cases During 1978,31 AD. L. REV. 123, 127 (1979) (Vermont Yankee "aborted this
line of cases" creating a trend toward judicial imposition of hybrid rulemaking procedures); Schwartz, Some Recent Administrative Law Trends: Delegation and Judicial Review, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 208, 215 (the "high bench has been unwilling to
allow courts to impose requirements upon rulemaking not contained in delegating
statutes"); Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 258, 290 (1978) ("But there is little need to speculate on the future of this
process [hybrid rulemaking] since the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee . .. has
made it plain that lower courts have no power to expand APA informal rulemaking
procedures as part of their function of judicial review."); Note, Administrative Law
- Reviewing Courts Restrictedfrom Imposing Procedures/or Informal Rulemaking
Beyond Those Specified in Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act or Other
Relevant Statutes. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), 28 CATH. V.L. REV. 411, 422 (1979) (the
case reflects "the Court's desire to put an end to judicial activism through procedural review."); Note, A Specific Proposal for Hybrid Rulemaking, 7 COLUM. J. OF
ENV'T. L. 69, 76 (1980) (the case "severely curtailed judicial use of remands to
encourage agencies to employ procedures beyond those required by the AP A");
Note, Judicial Imposition of Rulemaking Procedures on Administrative Agencies:
The Impact of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 171, 186 (1978) (the case "will have far
reaching effects on administrative procedure"); Judicial Review 0/ Administrative
Agency Action - 1) Absent Compelling Circumstances a Reviewing Court May Not
Require Informal Rulemaking Procedures That Exceed Those Required by Section
553 of the Administrative Procedure Act - 2) Agencies May Place Reasonable Limitations On The Consideration of Alternatives Proposed Under The National Environmental Policy Act. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), 19 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 799, 806-07
(1979) (the case's greatest significance lies in its reversal of the trend, especially
apparent in the District of Columbia Circuit, toward requiring rulemaking procedures that are more elaborate than those required by section 553 of the APA); Note,
Administrative Law - Administrative Procedure - Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 314, 336 ("a strong mandate . . . telling the lower courts to
stop 'meddling' with agency procedures"); cf Beatson, A British View of Vermont
Yankee, 55 TuL. L. REV. 435 (1981) (recognizes the significance of Vermont Yankee but suggests that its importance may be overestimated by other commentators);
Nathanson, The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Opinion: A Masterpiece of Statutory Misinterpretation, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 183, 202-06 (1979) (urging amendment of the AP A to deal with the case, an unlikely event; in the interim pointing to
the exceptions and remand for inadequate reasons as alternatives); Priew, A French
View of Vermont Yankee, 55 TUL. L. REV. 465 (1981) (discussing possible reactions
of French courts to a Vermont Yankee situation); Schoenbaum, A Preface to Three
Foreign Views of Vermont Yankee, 55 TuL. L. REV. 428 (1981) (presenting the
British, French, and Japanese reactions to Vermont Yankee.)
39. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 38, at 396 ("a new tone for the decision of administrative
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cance of the decision. 40 The evidence is ample that there is no consensus
or clear direction in the legal literature concerning the significance and
probable future of the principles of Vermont Yankee. The conflicting signals of the opinion itself in some measure contributed to this; the varying
views as to the desirability of the Supreme Court's inclinations concerning the proper role of court and agency in rulemaking seem to have provided the rest. Yet, as all would concede, the true test of the significance
of the principles of Vermont Yankee awaited subsequent refinement by
the Supreme Court and their reception in the lower federal judiciary.
III.

RESPONSE AND REACTION IN THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY

Although the Supreme Court to date has not refined the principles
of Vermont Yankee in any significant respect, it has on occasion confirmed its commitment to its fundamental principles. The case does appear to be firmly established as a benchmark in the relationship between
court and agency in the formulation of rulemaking procedure.
In Crysler Corp. v. Brown,41 the Court noted that in Vermont Yankee it had held that only in cases involving extraordinary circumstances
would the courts be permitted to impose procedural requirements beyond those required under the APA.42 It pointed out that agencies and
not the courts possess the discretion to afford more than statutorily mandated procedures; however, in this case the issue was whether regulations
that were procedurally defective could have the force and effect of law.
In this context, the Court observed that the judiciary has both the authority and the duty to make certain that agencies comply with the statutory mandates of the APA.43
In 1983, the Court again considered Vermont Yankee in the context
of rulemaking. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources De-

40.

41.
42.
43.

law cases - a tone of judicial restraint and great deference . . . if the D.C. Circuit
deigns to follow it. ").
See, e.g., DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65
VA. L. REV. 257, 316 ("a narrow ruling, despite its stinging language"); Rodgers, A
Hard Look at Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO.
L. J. 699, 713, 714 (1979) ("The serious implications of Vermont Yankee for hard
look procedures, nonetheless, are unlikely to materialize;" the case "forbids a narrow form of appellate directive that is almost never used, perhaps not even in the
case under review"); Recent Development, 9 ENVTL. L. 653 (1979) ("Due to the
conflicting standards provided by the Court, the Vermont Yankee decision is unlikely to have a major impact on review of rulemaking proceedings."). See also E.
Gellhorn and Robinson, Rulemaking "Due Process'~' An Inconclusive Dialogue, 48
U. CHI. L. REV. 201, 214-15 (1981) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Vermont
Yankee, invalidating judicial imposition of special procedures on agency rulemaking, compounds the uncertainty, especially inasmuch as the decision itself has an
unclear future.").
441 U.S. 281 (1979).
Id. at 312.
Id. at 312·13.
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fense Council, Inc. 44 involved the return to the Court of a case which it
had remanded for further consideration in the wake of Vermont Yankee. 4s On remand, Judge Bazelon concluded that the agency rules in
question lacked support in the record and were invalid. 46 The Supreme
Court disagreed and found that the agency, in assuming that permanent
storage of nuclear wastes poses no significant environmental risks, was
acting within the realm of reasoned decisionmaking. 47 Concerning Vermont Yankee, it noted:
this Court unanimously reversed the Court of Appeals' decision
that the Commission had used inadequate procedures, finding
that the Commission had done all that was required by NEP A
and the AP A and determining that courts generally lack authority to impose "hybrid" procedures greater than those comtemplated by the governing statutes.
As Vermont Yankee made clear, NEPA does not require
agencies to adopt any particular internal decisionmaking
structure. 48
Yet the Court has also restated the point that Vermont Yankee is
not without limits. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the
United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. ,49 the
Court concluded that the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration had been arbitrary and capricious in rescinding its vehicle
crash protection standard, and stated:
Petitioners also invoke our decision in Vermont Yankee [citation omitted], as though it were a talisman under which any
agency decision is by definition unimpeachable. Specifically, it
is submitted that to require an agency to consider an airbagsonly alternative is, in essence, to dictate to the agency the procedures it is to follow. Petitioners both misread Vermont Yankee and misconstrue the nature of the remand that is in order.
In Vermont Yankee, we held that a court may not impose additional procedural requirements upon an agency. We do not require today any specific procedure which NHTSA must follow.
Nor do we broadly require an agency to consider all policy al44. 462 U.S. 87 (1983), rev'g Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
45. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 964 (1978)
(mem.); see a/so Long Island Lighting Co. v. Lloyd Harbor Study Group, Inc., 435
U.S. 964 (1978) (mem.).
46. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
47. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87,
104 (1983).
48. [d. at 92, 100.
49. 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983).

266

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 14

ternatives in reaching decision. 50
There is some indication that the Court does not intend to confine
the principles of Vermont Yankee to rulemaking, although it has not focused on this issue. In Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation,51 the Court
reemphasized the teaching of Vermont Yankee as "the fundamental administrative law principle" that formulation of administrative procedures
is to be left primarily to the agencies. 52 The case concerned the validity
of the EPA's administrative summary judgment rules for essentially adjudicatory proceedings. Informal rulemaking was not at issue. In a different case, in which the Court reviewed judicial imposition of
mandatory deadlines on the adjUdication of Social Security disability
benefits, it declined to reach the contention that the deadlines improperly
interfered with agency discretion to develop procedures for adjudication.53 It did conclude, however, that the deadlines constituted an "unwarranted judicial intrusion," but not explicitly because of impermissible
judicial interference with agency discretion in choosing procedure. The
Court instead reasoned that Congressional awareness of the delay problem and repeated Congressional rejection of deadlines as a solution made
the judicial imposition of deadlines unwarranted. 54
The result is that there is no indication of retreat from the principles
of Vermont Yankee on the part of the Court. The limited picture available is one of restatement and reassertion. Unfortunately, there also has
been no development, refinement, or clarification of the ambiguities of
the opinion. It remains unclear whether the Court intends Vermont Yankee to apply to administrative action other than rulemaking and what is
the reach of the exceptions to the principles of the opinion. In contrast,
there has been extensive response and reaction in the lower federal
courts. 55
50. Id. at 2870-71.
51. 445 U.S. 198 (1980).
52. Id. at 214-15; see also Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 755
(1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The scope of our review of the procedures the
Board uses to accomplish its mission is limited, and the constitutional constraints on
them are attenuated. Unless the agency goes entirely beyond its statutory mandate,
violates its own procedures, or fails to provide an affected party due process of law,
we have no role in specifying what methods it mayor may not use in finding facts or
reaching conclusions oflaw or policy."); Heckler v. Lopez, 104 S. Ct. 10, 13, motion
to vacate denied, 104 S. Ct. 221 (1983) (Rehnquist, J.) (Grant of stay of preliminary
injunction with instructions that it be evaluated in accordance with "familiar principles of administrative law" that procedures are to be left to the agencies. The case
involved agency practices in termination of Social Security disability benefits.); cf.
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980)
(courts may not interject themselves into matters properly left to agency discretion).
53. Heckler v. Day, 104 S. Ct. 2249, 2257-58 (1984).
54. Id. at 2253, 2257-58.
55. Federal agencies have been predictably enthusiastic and have cited the case to justify
denials of procedures in excess of those required under the AP A or applicable statutes, including adjudicatory hearings, 48 Fed. Reg. 396 (1983) (CAB), 47 Fed. Reg.
26,982 (1982) (FDA), 46 Fed. Reg. 12,065 (1981) (FERC), 45 Fed. Reg. 51,520
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A.

The District Courts
Generally, the reaction in the federal district courts has been one of
respectful adherence to the fundamental principles and philosophic underpinnings of Vermont Yankee. 56 There is no significant evidence of
resistance or inclination to disregard Vermont Yankee. Indeed, the district courts have tended to transport Vermont Yankee's deference to administrative and legislative determinations of procedure from the context
of informal rulemaking to other forms of administrative action.
In rulemaking, Vermont Yankee has caused the district courts to
look to applicable statutes and agency regulations to determine required
procedures. For example, in a simple case in which the rulemaking was
informal and the agency elected to do nothing more than that required
(1980) (CFTA), oral hearings, 45 Fed. Reg. 65,916 (1980) (OSHA), cross-examination, 45 Fed. Reg. 8509 (1980) (EPA), limits on ex parte contacts, 45 Fed. Reg.
35,582 (1980) (FCC), and separation of functions, 46 Fed. Reg. 24,694 (1981)
(FDA).
Although state courts in interpreting their own APAs are not constrained by
the case, a number have generally been receptive to its basic outlook. See, e.g.,
Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Department of Pub. Health, 379 Mass. 70, 393
N.E.2d 881 (1979) (Massachusetts law did not contain a provision comparable to
the APA's requirement of a statement of basis and purpose and the court was not
willing to impose one); Northern Plains Resource Council v. Board of Natural Resources & Conservation, 181 Mont. 500, 594 P.2d 297 (1979); Somer v. Woodhouse,
28 Wash. App. 262, 275, 623 P.2d 1164, 1171 (1981) ("Where an agency is engaged
in rule making in its purest form, additional procedural devices beyond those required by the administrative procedures act are not constitutionally required.").
This phenomenon has not been limited to the general principles of Vermont Yankee.
Some have given serious consideration to the compelling circumstances and constitutional constraint exceptions. See, e.g., Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Department of
Pub. Utils., 383 Mass. 675, 676 n.l, 421 N.E.2d 449, 450 n.l (1981); Tri-State Generation & Transmission Ass'n, Inc. v. Environmental Quality Council, 590 P.2d
1324, 1331-32 (Wyo. 1979). Reference to and reliance upon the case have not been
limited to administrative rulemaking. See, e.g., Atwell v. Power Auth., 67 A.D.2d
365, 380,415 N.Y.S.2d 476, 484 (1979) (burden of proof in certificate of need proceeding) appeal denied, 49 N.Y.2d 797, 403 N.E.2d 456, 415 N.Y.S.2d 733 (1980);
Cannonsburg Gen. Hosp. v. Department of Health, 492 Pa. 68, 75,422 A.2d 141,
145 (1980) (certification of hospital building program). State cases rejecting Vermont Yankee are rare. See, e.g., Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Air Resources Bd., 181
Cal. Rptr. 199, 129 Cal. 3d 682 (1982); see also Haight v. District of Columbia
Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 439 A.2d 487, 491-92 (D.C. 1981) (the court was
"hesitant to second guess" the liquor licensing board's evidentiary rulings if "within
the bounds of reason"); Dupont Circle Citizens Ass'n v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 431 A.2d 560, 565 (D.C. 1981) (written summaries of expert testimony were adequate and in accord with the board's own rules of procedure);
Citizens Ass'n v. Zoning Comm'n, 392 A.2d 1027, 1036-42 (D.C. 1978) (ex parte
contacts not prohibited); cf Moskowitz, Vermont Yankee in California's Courts, 13
PAC. L. J. 315 (1982).
56. The research method employed in this study would not reveal a quiet rebellion
against the principles of Vermont Yankee. If a court were to ignore the decision, fail
to cite it and proceed to impose additional rulemaking procedures, the case is likely
to have fallen through the gap created by reliance on citation of Vermont Yankee.
Presumably the adversarial process reduces this risk. It seems unlikely that a court
would ignore a relevant and forceful argument based on Vermont Yankee without
revealing that fact in its opinion.
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by statute, notice and comment pursuant to section 553 of the APA sufficed, and the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia considered its role limited and narrow. 57 Vermont Yankee provides the barrier
to courts doing more. 58
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York was similarly deferential in a case in which the underlying statute
required more than simple notice and comment. In Commodity Exchange, Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 59 the court
found that more than submission of written comments was required in
connection with the agency's disapproval of certain commodity exchange
rules. The basis for this was the statutory "opportunity for hearing" that
Congress required in rule disapproval proceedings; however, the court
did not take this to mean that an adjudicatory hearing was in order. 6O It
noted:
The AP A mandates a trial-type hearing in rulemaking or adjudication only when the statute specifies that it be made "on the
record." Section 5a(12) of the Act contains no such provision.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. has
clearly instructed, generally agencies should be free to fashion
their own rules of procedures absent a congressional requirement that the hearing be "on the record" . . . . 61
Nevertheless, on this occasion the court found that the agency had exceeded the bounds of its procedural freedom in limiting comment to written submissions. It held that an opportunity must be afforded for nonadjudicatory oral presentations on disapproval of the exchange rule; its
reason was that this was what Congress intended. 62 But this was not a
case of judicially created and imposed procedures in excess of notice and
comment. It was one of assuring that the agency proceeded as Congress
intended.
The influence of Vermont Yankee is particularly evident in cases in
which Congress has been silent in the sense that the rules in question are
exempt from AP A notice-and-comment procedure. In Saint Joseph Hospital v. Heckler,63 the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana upheld a rule concerning reimbursement for telephones
used by Medicare patients. One assertion was that the agency had failed
57. Association of Am. R.R. v. Adams, 485 F. Supp. 1077, 1083-84 (D.D.C. 1978)
(challenge to adequacy of opportunity to be heard in Federal Railroad Administration's rulemaking concerning lighting devices on freight trains).
58. National Treasury Employees Union v. Devine, 577 F. Supp. 648, 651 (D.D.C.
1983) ("Absent an express timing provision concerning posting in the statute, the
court declines to read one in.").
59. 543 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. N.Y. 1982), affd, 703 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1983) (mem.).
60. [d. at 1347-48.
61. [d. at 1348.
62. [d. at 1352.
63. 570 F. Supp. 434 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
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to create a contemporaneous record in promulgating the rule. The court
rejected this argument "under the dictates of Vermont Yankee,"64 noting
that this rule was exempt from the APA's requirement of a "concise general statement of [the rule's] basis and purpose" that underlies the contemporaneous record requirement and that there was no common law of
administrative procedure that it could invoke to create a record requirement. 65 Bedford County General Hospital v. Heckler 66 reached the same
conclusion with respect to the same issue and the same rules. 67
In rulemaking that is exempt from the notice and comment requirement, other district courts have held similarly in connection with other
requests for added procedures. In Haddon Township Board of Education
v. New Jersey Department of Education,68 the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey concluded that a Department of
Agriculture rule was interpretative and thus exempt; in light of Vermont
Yankee it declined "to require any notice and comment procedures on
the basis of common law notions of fundamental fairness which go beyond the APA mandate."69 The United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts found that the AP A's notice requirement was
inapplicable to a Department of Interior change in its land acquisition
policy, holding that such notice was "completely voluntarY,"7o and that
the court was constrained by Vermont Yankee from imposing a notice
requirement.?! Yet another district court felt Vermont Yankee precluded
64. [d. at 439; cf Diplomat Lakewood Inc. v. Califano, 453 F. Supp. 442, 446-47
(D.D.C. 1978) (the court found the statement of basis and purpose in question sufficient under the APA, citing Vermont Yankee. This is an example of the case's influence where it need not have been invoked at all.), rev'd, 613 F.2d 1009 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
65. 570 F. Supp. 434, 437-39 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
66. 574 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Tenn. 1983).
67. [d. at 946. The court stated:
Plaintiffs find a lack of consideration of relevant factors because the regulation was promulgated without a record. Rulemaking relative to benefits
is exempt from Administrative Procedure Act rulemaking requirements
. . . . Plaintiffs, however, argue that there is a constitutional or common
law requirement for development of an administrative record. The United
States Supreme Court has held that 5 U.S.c. § 553 'established the maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the
courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures.' Vermont Yankee [citation omitted] . . . . Because the Secretary was exempt
from rulemaking proceedings, the lack of an administrative record does
not render the regulation in question arbitrary and capricious.
[d.
68. 476 F. Supp. 681, 698 n.15 (D.N.J. 1979).
69. [d. at 698 n.15; see also Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. TVA, 462 F. Supp. 464,
475 (M.D. Tenn. 1978) (the court would not require notice-and-comment rulemaking for rules within the "public property" exception under the APA).
70. Greenwald v. Olsen, 583 F. Supp. 1002, 1006 n.ll (D. Mass. 1984).
71. [d. Vermont Yankee has assured comparable restraint in judicial review of procedures which attend preparation of environmental impact statements under the National Environmental Policy Act. Gloucester County Concerned Citizens v.
Goldschmidt, 533 F. Supp. 1222, 1228 (D.N.J.), affd, 677 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1982);
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prohibition of ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking, noting that
"[w]hile such ex parte comments seem highly inappropriate, they do not
appear to be prohibited under the Administrative Procedure Act
• • • • "72 The prevailing philosophy is that it is "not the role of the
Court to impose a particular decision-making process on an agency
where none has been provided by Congress."73
The district courts have not ignored the possible exceptions noted in
Vermont Yankee, which would allow judicial imposition of additional
procedures in rulemaking in cases of "constitutional constraints or in extremely compelling circumstances . . . . "74 On one occasion, a district
court rejected the argument that because an agency is entitled to require
more procedural steps than even its own rules demand, the discretion to
require more is not reviewable. Although it conceded that "Vermont
Yankee lends support to this position" and requires judicial deference,
that deference is not absolute. Before deciding that deference is appropriate, a court has the duty to determine whether either of the exceptions
applies. 75
Although they acknowledge the possibility of exceptions to the general Vermont Yankee rule, the district courts have yet to encounter a case
jutifying application of an exception. For example, one issue in Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. TVA 76 was whether the court would be justified
in imposing publication requirements on timetables for TVA Board meetings. It found that there were no established timetables and none had
become established practice; therefore, the court could not justify intervention on the basis of Vermont Yankee's exception for deviation from
longstanding and well established practices,?7 In Women's Health Services, Inc. v. Maher,18 the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut observed that although the plaintiff had not argued an absence of procedural due process, the argument would fail because the
Constitution does not require a hearing in rulemaking, and the exception
in Vermont Yankee is not available when, as in this case, the rule is of
"broad applicability. "79

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

National Wildlife Fed'n v. Goldschmidt, 504 F. Supp. 314, 325 n.40 (D. Conn.
1980); Committee Against R.R. Relocation v. Adams, 471 F. Supp. 142, 145 (E.D.
Ark. 1979).
McCulloch Gas Processing Corp. v. Department of Energy, 498 F. Supp. 194, 205
(D. Wyo. 1979), affd in part, rev'd in part, 650 F.2d 1216 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1981).
Ashton v. Pierce, 541 F. Supp. 635, 644 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, 716 F.2d 56 (D.C.
Cir. 1983).
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435
U.S. 519, 543 (1978). See generally supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Department of Interior, 553 F. Supp. 872, 879-80 (C.D. Utah
1982).
462 F. Supp. 464, 465 (M.D. Tenn. 1978).
Id. at 475.
514 F. Supp. 265 (D. Conn. 1981).
Id. at 270-71 n.2.
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Saint Joseph's Hospital Health Center v. Blue Cross 80 is another district court case that illustrates the probable outcome when the Vermont
Yankee exceptions are invoked. It involved an unsuccessful challenge to
Medicare rules authorizing disclosure of cost reports filed by participating hospitals. Although it was determined that the rules were promulgated in accordance with applicable AP A procedures, the "plaintiff
nonetheless urge[d] this Court to impose additional procedural requirements after the fact because the minimum requirements fixed by Congress did not ensure mature consideration of the interests at stake."81
The court declined and adhered to the basic principle that agencies
should be left to fashion their own rulemaking procedures. In the process it refused to consider this a case of extremely compelling circumstance, noting "the United States Supreme Court's repeated warning that
the complexity or importance of the issues under consideration will not
alone justify ex post facto judicial interference with agency rulemaking
procedures. "82
This does not mean, however, that the district courts' acceptance of
Vermont Yankee has caused them to conclude that there is little for them
to do in review of rulemaking. It does not mean that Vermont Yankee
need only be cited and the courts will defer. In an action against the
Corps of Engineers to prevent flooding of a Mississippi River floodway,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri described its scope of review as follows:
[I]n determining whether proper procedures have been followed by the agency, this Court is mindful that absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances,
administrative agencies should be free to fashion their rules of
procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their very important duties, subject to
the statutory requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act. 83
Yet the court still found that the agency's action was invalid rulemaking
for failure to afford notice and comment. 84 What the court was performing was the obvious task of assuring that the statutory procedures Congress intended to require were afforded by the agency, a judicial role fully
consistent with Vermont Yankee principles. Other district courts have
taken a similar approach in concluding that notice-and-comment procedures were required85 or that the statement of basis and purpose was
80. 489 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
81. Id. at 1061.
82. Id. at 1061-62; accord Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Duncan, 499 F. Supp. 672, 680
(D. Or. 1980) (challenge to rate increase of Bonneville Power Administration).
83. Story v. Marsh, 574 F. Supp. 505, 514 (E.D. Mo. 1983), rev'd, 732 F.2d 1375 (8th
Cir. 1984).
84. Id. at 514-15.
85. Associated Dry Goods Corp. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 543 F.
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inadequate. 86
A striking aspect of the history of Vermont Yankee in the district
courts is their inclination to apply its basic principles beyond the context
of informal rulemaking. A statement that "it is significant that the Vermont Yankee case [is] concerned with agency rulemaking which, in this
Court's view, is not comparable to the situation at hand"87 is exceptional.
The norm has been to invoke, apply, and expand Vermont Yankee to
other forms of administrative action.
Becker v. Blum 88 represents an intermediate point in this transition
of the Vermont Yankee rule from application to rulemaking to application to other forms of administrative action. In Becker, Medicaid beneficiaries had challenged the notice required under the New York Social
Services Law and the regulations by which that law was implemented.
In defense, the state agency challenged the validity of federal regulations
that governed state notice to recipients; it argued that the rules were arbitrary and capricious in requiring notice. 89 The procedures by which the
rules were promulgated were not at issue. The argument concerned the
desirability of notice in adjudicatory proceedings, and the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York found: "The federal regulations are not arbitrary but reasonably serve a valid purpose.
'Absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances' [citation to Vermont Yankee] . . . , the federal regulations must
be and are upheld."90 Thus, this court used Vermont Yankee to define a
test for substantive review of rules, and not just for review of the procedures by which those rules had been promulgated. 91

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Supp. 950, 964 (E.D. Va. 1982) ("[t]he Court is convinced that the substantial impact test survives the Supreme Court's prohibition of the judicial formulation of
hybrid rulemaking proceedings in Vermont Yankee . . . . "); Cerro Metal Prod. v.
Marshall, 467 F. Supp. 869, 879-80 (E.D. Pa. 1979) ("But the determination of
whether a regulation substantially affects the rights of those it regulates does not
stray beyond the Act, rather it serves to define what is a procedural rule within the
meaning of the Act."); Sannon v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 458, 466 (S.D. Fla.
1978), rev'd on other grounds, 631 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1980).
See McCulloch Gas Processing Corp. v. Department of Energy, 498 F. Supp. 194,
200-04 (D. Wyo. 1979), ajJ'd in part. rev'd in part, 650 F.2d 1216 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1981).
Georgia Gazette Publishing Co. v. United States Dep't of Defense, 562 F. Supp.
1004, 1007 (S.D. Ga. 1983) (preliminary injunction granted following award of publishing contract for military post newspaper).
464 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
[d. at 157.
[d.
See Fort Worth & D. Ry. v. Goldschmidt, 518 F. Supp. 121, 138 (N.D. Tex. 1981)
("Therefore, from the very language of the statute, it is clear that Congress intended
that the FRA be allowed wide discretion in establishing the actual penalty level.
This Court is therefore, extremely reluctant to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency. Vermont Yankee . . . . "), rev'd, 693 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1982); Holbrook v.
Pitt, 479 F. Supp. 990, 996 (E.D. Wis. 1979), rev'd, 643 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1981)
(rule allowing apparently arbitrary retroactive certification for eligibility for HUD
benefits not challenged; court cited Vermont Yankee for the proposition that it was
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Pasco Terminals, Inc. v. United States 92 involved an action against
the Tariff Commission to recover dumping duties. The Customs Court
turned aside assertions that cross-examination was required in the administrative proceeding, noting that the applicable statute did not require
a hearing, and that due process did not necessarily require a trial-type
hearing with an opportunity for cross-examination. The administrative
action in this instance was only an informal adjudicatory type fact finding investigation for which neither statute nor Constitution demanded
cross-examination. 93 There is little that is extraordinary in the court's
conclusion, but it is noteworthy that the court quoted the "absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances . . . " language of Vermont Yankee as authority.94 This district court thus went
beyond applying the Vermont Yankee doctrine to procedural review of
informal or hybrid rulemaking, beyond application to substantive review
of rules, and in fact extended application of the Vermont Yankee principles entirely beyond the context of rules and rulemaking to a new area: to
procedural review of informal adjudicatory proceedings.
Other cases invoking Vermont Yankee to justify a limited judicial
role in review of agency adjudicatory procedures include an action by a
federal employee to recover health insurance benefits,95 and an action
against EPA to review its decision to stop further processing of a grant
application for a sewerage treatment plant. 96
Vermont Yankee has also influenced district courts' perceptions of
their own equitable powers. For example, in an action to remove a federally appointed receiver for a state savings and loan, a district court found
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's action in appointing the receiver
to be in violation of the applicable statute and its underlying policy. The
court therefore ordered the receiver removed. 97 It held that the Board
had failed to establish the statutory prerequisites for Board jurisdiction,
but noted that the "power to reexamine the Board's decision [that it had
"not at liberty to impose [its] own. notions as to how the . . . program ought to be
administered").
92. 477 F. Supp. 201 (Cust. Ct. 1979), affd, 634 F.2d 610 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
93. Id. at 213.
94.Id.
95. Levin v. Connecticut Blue Cross, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 385, 386-88 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(court notes that since Congress gave the Office of Personnel Management discretion as to performance of its duties, the agency's procedures are "immune from
attack absent either constitutional constraints or extremely compelling
circumstances").
96. State ex rei. Burch v. Costle, 452 F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (D.D.C. 1978) (when an
agency exercises judgment on a set of facts, the court should defer and not substitute
its judgment for that of the agency); cf Southwest Jefferson County Homeowners,
Inc. v. Costle, 468 F. Supp. 405, 407-09 (W.D. Ky. 1979) (court refused to intervene
in EPA's decision not to require an environmental impact statement as to part of a
sewer project, "absent a showing of extremely compelling circumstances or any constitutional constraint. . .").
97. Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 540 F. Supp. 1374
(N.D. Cal.), rev'd, 689 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983).
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jurisdiction to appoint a receiver] is not unlimited. On the contrary, the
normal rule that fundamental policy questions should be resolved by the
legislative and executive branches and not by the courts applies with
equal force to the present situation."98 The court cited Vermont Yankee
for this proposition, thus acknowledging that application of the Vermont
Yankee doctrine can limit a court's equity jurisdiction. 99
When there is no question of jurisdiction, however, one district
court has found nothing in Vermont Yankee to inhibit the exercise of its
power to formulate equitable relief commensurate to the harm. Citing
Vermont Yankee, among others, it noted that "although the Supreme
Court has made it clear that a court, in formulating equitable relief,
should not usurp traditional administrative functions," once jurisdiction
is established the court may provide such equitable relief as necessary to
address the harm,lOO Finally, in a case in which a disappointed bidder
sought an injunction prohibiting award of a publishing contract for an
army post's newspaper, a district court dismissed arguments against the
injunction based on Vermont Yankee. The court reasoned that neither
statute nor regulation required use of informal rulemaking procedures in
making the contract award, that Vermont Yankee concerned agency
rulemaking, and that therefore the situation in Vermont Yankee was one
which "is not comparable to the situation at hand."lOl Thesignificance
of these cases is not so much that district courts may perceive Vermont
Yankee to mandate limited use of their equity powers when administrative agencies are involved, but is rather that one finds the courts confronting Vermont Yankee so far afield from judicial imposition of
additional procedures in informal rulemaking. 102
98. Id. at 1378; see also Biscayne Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank
Bd., 572 F. Supp. 997, 1003-04 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (Board's exercise of discretion in
deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction to appoint a receiver not entirely beyond
reach of court's review, because Board accused of "outrageous behavior"; court nevertheless acknowledged that a court is generally to refrain from substituting its judgment for the Board's decision to exercise jurisdiction, once the court is satisfied that
statutory criteria were met).
99. Fidelity Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 540 F. Supp. 1374,
1378, rev'd, 689 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983).
100. Doe v. Heckler, 580 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (D. Md. 1984).
101. Georgia Gazette Publishing Co. v. United States Dep't of Defense, 562 F. Supp.
1004 (S.D. Ga. 1983).
102. Vermont Yankee has also been considered in a number of class actions challenging
administrative delay in Social Security benefit hearings. See, e.g., Deloney v.
Califano, 488 F. Supp. 610, 613 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("The Court also has reservations
with respect to the proper role of the courts in this type of administrative proceedings. In Vermont Yankee . .. the Supreme Court expressed concern that reviewing
courts will '(engraft) their own notions of proper procedures upon agencies entrusted with substantive functions by Congress.'. . . While evidence of greatly disproportionate delays in agency action or evidence of a lack of evenhandedness or a
dilatory motive on the part of an agency may in some cases warrant judicial relief,
here there is no such evidence."); Blankenship v. Secretary, 522 F. Supp. 618, 61920 (W.O. Ky. 1981) ("We agree with the defendants that examination of the proposals for 'desirability' would, under the circumstances of this case, violate all prin-
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Vermont Yankee has had an even more curious history in the district courts in its relationship to some traditional administrative law doctrines. In one case, the plaintiff sought an injunction against the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) to bar release of information concerning its products. The CPSC was in the process of promulgating disclosure rules, and the District Court for the Northern District
of New York found that the information could not be disclosed until the
rulemaking process was complete. It said that it would not pass on the
rules until they were adopted and cited Vermont Yankee for the proposition that judicial review on the CPSC's substantive defenses was precluded for now.to3 The court thus brought Vermont Yankee into the area
of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. In another case
a district court observed that "the method of exercising the delegated
authority, whether by rulemaking or adjudication, is up to the Secretary
to determine," and cited only Vermont Yankee. 104 SEC v. Chenery
Corp.toS (Chenery II) is the case usually cited to support this proposition. Is Vermont Yankee now to supplant Chenery II?
The reality is that the district courts have not only followed Vermont Yankee, but arguably have extended it. Cases resisting, much less
rejecting, its principles are few. Only one appears to depart from it. In
Hoeber v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency,106 the District Court for the District of Columbia held that an area urban renewal
plan could not be modified without an impact analysis and written consent of affected landowners and lessees. The court noted that the agency
could adopt rules to establish a method for determining substantial and
adverse effects on such persons and observed:
Vermont Yankee . . . is not inconsistent with this procedure.
In that case, the Supreme Court held that courts may not impose procedural requirements beyond those specified in the Administrative Procedure Act . . . . Here, plaintiffs have not
requested the imposition of additional procedural requirements,
but the Court is filling a void left by a statutory provision which
necessitates procedures to give it meaning and content. to7
Vermont Yankee, of course, suggests that just this kind of procedural
void is to be filled by Congress or the agency and not by the jUdiciary.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

ciples of separation of powers. Vermont Yankee. . . . We do not believe that . . .
this Court [has] the authority to reach out to decide issues of purely internal
administration. ").
Fountainhead Group, Inc. v. CPSC, 527 F. Supp. 294 (N.D.N.Y. 1981), order vacated, 559 F. Supp. 17 (N.D. N.Y. 1982).
Matze v. Block, 564 F. Supp. 1157, 1166 (D. Kan. 1983), ajJ'd in part, rev'd in part,
732 F.2d 799, 802-03 (10th Cir. 1984) (the court of appeals was willing to require
rulemaking rather than adjudication on abuse of discretion grounds).
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (the choice between rulemaking
and adjudication is primarily a matter for the "informed discretion" of the agency).
483 F. Supp. 1356 (D.D.C. 1980), ajJ'd, 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1369 n.45.
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Courts of Appeals Other Than the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit

The pattern in the courts of appeals has been comparable to that in
the district courts, with only slightly greater evidence of an inclination to
limit or to depart from the teaching of Vermont Yankee. In light of the
importance of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in administrative law generally, and especially in Vermont Yankee, it is
examined separately in the section that follows. Courts of appeals have
cited Vermont Yankee in a number of cases in which the courts declined
to impose additional procedural requirements in rulemaking. 108
McCulloch Gas Processing Corp. v. Department of Energyl09 presented an interesting and added dimension to the Vermont Yankee prob108. See, e.g., American Mining Congress v. Marshall, 671 F.2d 1251, 1260-61 (10th Cir.
1982) (alleged procedural defects in an informal rulemaking were agency's failure to
stamp documents with date and failure to include in index certain documents received after close of comment period; court refused to declare rule invalid, finding
no evidence that agency had relied on late documents or that documents were critical, and that "for this court to impose these requirements would be to disregard the
Supreme Court's holding" in Vermont Yankee); North Am. Van Lines v. ICC, 666
F.2d 1087, 1092 (7th Cir. 1981) (ICC allegedly failed to give sufficient time for study
of proposed rule; actually ICC had extended the statutory period for comment from
30 to 45 days; court found the demand for more without merit and beyond its authority). In another case involving time limits and the ICC, an agency rule provided
that determinations of market dominance for ratemaking purposes could be made
within 90 days. Western Coal Traffic League v. United States, 694 F.2d 378 (5th
Cir. 1982), affd en bane, 719 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2160
(1984). The court cited Vermont Yankee and found that the agency is the "best
arbiter of its ability adequately to consider those factors within the time allowed."
Id. at 392. For other cases in which courts of appeals found Vermont Yankee to
require judicial restraint from imposition of additional procedural requirements in
rulemaking, see Katherine Gibbs School, Inc. v. FTC, 612 F.2d 658, 670 (2d Cir.
1979) (court refused to impose limits on ex parte contacts between agency and an
"allegedly biased staff in rulemaking," citing Vermont Yankee and noting that the
alleged contacts did not violate due process and are more appropriately dealt with
by Congress; rule ultimately held invalid on grounds of violation of the applicable
statute), reh'g denied, 628 F.2d 755 (2d Cir. 1980). The dissenting judge on the
denial of rehearing noted: "I can only hope that the Court which decided Vermont
Yankee . .. will examine this, in my opinion, unjustifiable intrusion into the administrative process." Id. at 758. The dissenter believed that the majority, in setting
aside the FTC's rule on vocational and home study schools, had gone too far in its
interpretation of the degree of specificity which the statute required in the rule.
Accord Belenke v. SEC, 606 F.2d 193, 198 (7th Cir. 1979) (the argument that the
SEC should have followed a "more exacting procedural formula" in approving
amendments to exchange rules "violates the Supreme Court's admonition in Vermont Yankee that reviewing courts should be hesitant to impose more procedural
requirements than found in the authorizing statute or adopted by the administrative
agency"); Barton v. Bergland, 579 F.2d 1009, 1011 (6th Cir. 1978) (summary judgment affirmed denying injunction to suspend a Department of Agriculture rule;
court noted that the effect of the requested action would be to amend or suspend the
rule without normal rulemaking procedures, and it could not do this without imposing its own notions of "correct procedures" in contravention of Vermont Yankee).
109. 650 F.2d 1216 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1981), affg in part, rev'g in part, 498 F. Supp.
194 (D. Wyo. 1979). See supra text accompanying notes 72 & 86 for a discussion of
other aspects of the district court's decision.
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lem. To determine whether the administrative record was complete, the
district court had permitted depositions of agency officials responsible for
the rulemaking. The depositions, however, went beyond this purpose,
and the district court relied on some of the additional information garnered to invalidate the rule. I \0 The court of appeals found that:
the district court exceeded its authority in its consideration of
the depositions. In Vermont Yankee . .. the Court noted the
broad discretion vested in an agency to decide how it may best
proceed to develop the needed evidence to support its decision
. . . , and warned that unwarranted judicial examination of
perceived procedural shortcomings of a rulemaking proceeding
seriously interferes with the process prescribed by Congress. I I I
The effect of the decision was to treat the district court's use of the depositions as an impermissible addition of procedure to the rulemaking
process.
Challenges to agency rulemaking procedures have been similarly unsuccessful in cases involving rules exempt from AP A procedures. 112 The
prevailing view of Vermont Yankee is that its principles apply whether or
not a rule is exempt from notice and comment under the AP A. \13 The
issue is typically presented in a case in which a rule is considered interpretative and thus exempt, but the court nevertheless is asked to require
notice and comment. I 14 The general theory supporting imposition of no110. McCulloch Gas Processing Corp., 650 F.2d at 1229.
111. Id.
112. E.g., American Transfer & Storage Co. v. ICC, 719 F.2d 1283, 1303-06 (5th Cir.
1983) ("This case presents just the sort of 'subordinate questions of procedure'. . .
which ought to be left to the informed discretion of the Commissioner"; thus, the
court did not exercise the independent judgment it might have in addressing allegations of procedural irregularity, including material change between proposed and
final rule). Furthermore, the courts will and should make an independent determination of whether the rule is exempt or not. If it is not exempt, requiring noticeand-comment procedures to satisfy the terms of the AP A is entirely consistent with
Vermont Yankee. E.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy, 610 F.2d 796,
804-05 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980); Standard
Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 596 F.2d 1029, 1061-62 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.
1978) (court noted that in determining that the rule was interpretative it was not
imposing additional procedures; its concern was "compliance with minimum statutory requirements").
113. Love v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 704 F.2d 100, 105 n.17 (3d Cir.
1983).
114. The issue also has been presented in cases involving the question of whether
rulemaking was exempt from notice and comment under the "good cause" exception in section 553(b) of the APA. Thus, the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals has refused to "impose a new procedural requirement . . . contrary to
Vermont Yankee" when it was satisfied that the notice of "good cause" did provide
an adequate explanation. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy, 728 F.2d 1477,
1493 n.21 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3545 (1984). On
the other hand, the court indicated it was not imposing additional procedures contrary to Vermont Yankee when it concluded in another case that the "good cause"
exception was not available and therefore that notice and comment were required.
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tice and comment in such cases is that a common law of fairness demands this result when the interpretative rule has a "substantial impact"
on a segment of the public. I IS
The general reaction in the courts of appeals has been that this position is untenable in light of Vermont Yankee 1l6 because the decision
"cast considerable doubt on the viability of those €ases holding that the
notice and comment procedure may be judicially required even when not
required by the terms of the APA."117 A number have been fully cognizant of Professor Kenneth Culp Davis's view that Vermont Yankee
should be interpreted narrowly and does not preclude judicial development of administrative common law in such cases. I IS This is noteworthy
in light of the frequency with which the federal courts follow his lead.
The courts of appeals also have recognized the possible exceptions
to Vermont Yankee. Most of the cases in which the exceptions have been
raised, however, have involved proceedings other than informal rulemaking. Love v. United States Department of Housing & Urban Development 1l9 illustrates the exceptions in the context of rulemaking. The
district court had ordered notice-and-comment rulemaking to implement
tenant comment procedures for identifying unreasonable lease provisions. The district court's order was quite specific concerning how HUD
was to handle tenant comments. 120 HUD argued that under Vermont
Yankee the district court's order constituted "an unwarranted intrusion
on the Agency's prerogative" and was not a legitimate exercise of the
court's equitable powers or required under due process. 121

115.
116.

117.

118.

119.
120.
121.

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy, 610 F.2d 796, 804 (Temp. Emer. Ct.
App. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980). In another case the EPA argued that
statutory deadlines in developing federal air quality standards justified a "blanket
exemption" from notice and comment under the "good cause" standard; it pointed
to Vermont Yankee in support of this position. The court concluded that "[s]uch an
interpretation of 'good cause' would amount to judicial legislation." Western Oil &
Gas Ass'n v. United States Envt\. Protection Agency, 633 F.2d 803, 810-12 (9th Cir.
1980).
Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Block, 694 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1982).
See Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 889-91 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom.,
International Union v. Donovan, 104 S. Ct. 1591 (1984); American Trucking
Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 688 F.2d 1337, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 1982) (dictum),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3509 (1984); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Block, 694 F.2d
1205, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 1982) (dictum); Stoddard Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 627 F.2d
984, 986-88 (9th Cir. 1980); Energy Consumers and Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Energy, 632 F.2d 129, 139-41 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 832 (1980); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Department of Energy, 589 F.2d
1082 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978).
Rivera v. Becerra, 714 F.2d 887, 889-91 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom., International Union v. Donovan, 104 S. Ct. 1591 (1984).
Id.; Stoddard Lumber Co. v. Marshall, 627 F.2d 984, 987 (9th Cir. 1980); cf Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Department of Energy, 589 F.2d 1082, 1096 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1978) (judicial development of administrative common law is feasible only
in rare instances).
704 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 103.
Id. The court of appeals did not reach the issue of mandatory rulemaking presented
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The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit observed that informal
rulemaking was the appropriate mechanism for identifying unreasonable
lease provisions and that judicial imposition of other means of doing so
carried with it the risk of exactly what Vermont Yankee feared - "a
hovering judicial spectre [that] would scare agencies into adopting full
adjudicatory procedures . . . . "122 It rejected the argument that the
constitutional constraint exception justified more, reasoning that the
Constitution "does not require the resolution of facts on a case-by-case
basis" to determine unreasonable lease provisions, and that there was no
showing of compelling circumstances. 123
Both the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have also considered application of the Vermont Yankee exceptions in the rulemaking context. The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had little difficulty in disposing
of a claim, based upon due process, for additional procedures in rulemaking: "The allegation that there is a constitutional right to notice and an
opportunity to comment when an agency makes rules of general applicability is frivolous. It presents no substantial constitutional claim."124
Likewise, in a rulemaking case involving a request for more time to comment than required by the applicable statute, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit found no compelling circumstances justifying departure from the rule of Vermont Yankee. 125
Yet, as noted, the more extensive discussion of the exceptions is
found in cases in which informal rulemaking procedure was not at issue.
For example, in Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle,126 the First Circuit reviewed the adjudicatory procedures employed by the EPA 127 in
approving a nuclear plant's cooling system. The EPA Administrator had
ordered his staff not to appear as proponents of any particular result and
to avoid adversarial positions, and the petitioners argued that this "novel
order" was improper.128 The court noted that agencies have "wide latitude in fashioning their procedural rules."129 It also observed that
although Vermont Yankee recognizes a possible exception for unjustified
departures from well settled and longstanding agency practice, and even
assuming the "novel order" was such an unjustified departure, that exception is limited "to where the agency deprived some party other than

122.
123.
124.

125.
126.
127.

128.
129.

by the case. By the time the case reached the court, HUD had completed its
rulemaking and did not appeal the issue. [d. at 102-03.
[d. at 103.
[d. at 105.
Starnes v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 134, 141 n.4 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, Heckler v.
Starnes, 104 S. Ct. 2673 (1984).
North Am. Van Lines v. ICC, 666 F.2d 1087, 1092 (7th Cir. 1981).
597 F.2d 306 (1st Cir. 1979).
The EPA's order affirmed a prior order that had been invalidated by the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, which had remanded the issue to the EPA for rehearing. Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 824 (1978).
Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 597 F.2d 306, 307-08 (1st Cir. 1979).
[d. at 308.
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itself of important procedural rights normally accorded."130 This case
was not of that nature. 13l
In Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 132 the Second Circuit overruled a district court l33 that had appointed a special
master to oversee agency compliance with the district court's order setting forth certain procedural requirements for preparing Environmental
Impact Statements. 134 The court of appeals vacated that portion of the
judgment relating to the special master; in doing so it relied extensively
on Vermont Yankee and stated that "except in most extraordinary circumstances, the courts may not control the internal operations of federal
administrative agencies . . . . "135 It was not willing to conclude that the
case involved "extremely compelling circumstances"; assurance of timely
compliance and reducing the risk of later litigation were not enough to
justify appointment of the special master. 136
Application of the Vermont Yankee exceptions has also been raised
and rejected in a case involving a state's request that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission institute a proceeding and hold a hearing concerning
nuclear licensing,137 the Interstate Commerce Commission's denial of a
petition to reopen a railroad abandonment proceeding,138 and enforcement of a National Labor Relations Board bargaining order which was
developed through investigation rather than full adversarial
procedures. 139
130. Id. at 308 n.l.
131. See also Season-All Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 654 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1981). In this
case the court ordered an evidentiary hearing to investigate irregularities in connection with a representation election. The dissent believed the majority had required a
hearing when the "factual predicate" for a hearing was lacking, that the result was
"a court crafted rule" requiring a hearing on the basis of vague and unsupported
allegations, and that this contravened the principle of Vermont Yankee that procedural matters are to be left to the agency. Id. at 942-43 (Adams, J., dissenting).
The majority responded that its direction of an evidentiary hearing did not "in any
way implicate Vermont Yankee . . . " because all it was doing was requiring the
agency to follow its own policy to hold hearings when there is a dispute as to substantial and material issues of fact. Id. at 940-41 n.5.
Perhaps neither intending to nor aware that it had done so, the court apparently applied the "unjustified departure" exception to the Vermont Yankee rule but in the context of an adjudication rather than a rulemaking.
132. 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983).
133. 541 F. Supp. 1367 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
134. 701 F.2d 1011, 1042-43, 1043 n.30 (2d Cir. 1983).
135. Id. at 1042. The Court considered the action of the court of appeals in Vermont
Yankee "far less intrusive than . . . here, where the special master apparently was
to control every detail of every step of the agencies' reconsiderations." Id. at 1043.
136. Id. at 1043. The court also found there was insufficient evidence to present "a clear
and convincing picture of such pervasive bad faith as to suggest that absent judicial
supervision, the agency probably will not obey an injunction detailing its obligations." Id. at 1048.
137. People v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 591 F.2d 12, 15-16 (9th Cir. 1979).
138. City of Wausau v. United States, 703 F.2d 1042, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1983).
139. NLRB v: ARA Sers., Inc., 717 F.2d 57, 69 (3d Cir. 1983) (Adams, J., concurring).
The dissent suggested that to require a hearing in this case was to require no more
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There is at least one court of appeals case that does appear to have
relied on the exceptions to impose additional procedures outside of the
informal rulemaking context. The Interstate Commerce Commission
had approved an application for a certificate of public convenience and
necessity to abandon a railroad line. l40 The Commission had denied an
opportunity for cross-examination on supplementary evidence received
by the agency. Upon review, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit viewed the case as an informal adjudication 141 and concluded that
cross-examination should have been allowed: It noted:
We begin with a reluctance to interfere with an agency's freedom to fashion its own rules of procedure. See Vermont Yankee
. . . . But although requests for cross-examination are addressed to the discretion of an agency, that discretion is not
unlimited. A court may determine that 'extremely compelling
circumstances,' Vermont Yankee . .. exist to indicate that an
agency's decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. The question before us, then, is whether the facts here rise to such extremely compelling circumstances that the ICC should have
afforded the parties the opportunity for cross-examination. 142
It explained:

We emphasize the narrowness of our conclusion. . . . We do
not hold that the ICC must afford cross-examination in all
cases where supplemental evidence is taken after proceedings in
which cross-examination was allowed. Rather, our conclusion
is based on the combination of factors in this case: cross-examination was initially allowed; it played a key role in the determination of facts in the initial hearing; the agency then received
supplemental evidence of the same type as that provided, and
discredited after cross-examination, in the initial hearing; and
the agency's final decision ignored the many serious factual disputes and gave no indication that the agency could have resolved those disputes on the basis of the written supplementary
evidence submitted. 143
The intriguing feature of the case is that it was unnecessary for the court
to tum to Vermont Yankee. It had recognized the adjudicatory nature of
the proceeding and noted that "while there is no across-the-board right
to oral argument in every administrative proceeding, . . . the general
principle is that the right to be heard in adjudicative proceedings encompasses due process rights in excess of the right to submit written evi-

140.
141.
142.
143.

than the Board's own rules, and consequently there was no conflict with Vermont
Yankee. [d. at 74 n.8 (Garth, J., dissenting).
People v. United States, 666 F.2d 1066 (7th Cir. 1981).
[d. at 1071-72.
[d. at 1082.
[d. at 1083.
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dence."I44 Traditional notions of due process m administrative
adjudication would therefore have sufficed to require crossexamination. 145
The general principles of Vermont Yankee have had their impact in
the courts of appeals in contexts other than the procedures applicable in
informal rulemaking. 146 The general position is that when Congress es144. Id. at 1082.
145. Cf Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. United States, 585 F.2d 254 (7th Cir. 1978).
In this case, a railroad petitioned for review of an Interstate Commerce Commission
dismissal of its application to be included in a railroad merger. The court concluded
that dismissal of the application was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion by reason of inadequate notice of oral arguments on the merits of the railroad's
application. Id. at 259-60. The ICC argued that the APA's notice requirements
were inapplicable because this proceeding was neither rulemaking nor formal adjudication, and the court agreed. Id. at 260. The court said, however, that analysis
could not end at that: "Fundamental fairness in administrative proceedings requires
notice clearly informing a party of the proposed action and basis for that action."
Id. The court considered notice particularly important and its absence here "particularly unfair" in light of the "substantial economic detriment" possible. Id. at 262.
The court also agreed that there was no statutory duty to hold a hearing or make
findings, but that nevertheless "some type of fair proceeding" was in order. Id. at
262-63.
As to the nature of that "fair proceeding," the court made clear that the agency
could not employ summary procedures without an opportunity to be heard on the
merits. Id. The court further noted that courts may impose additional procedures
for reasons of fairness to ensure "principled decision-making," but that the exact
formulation of those procedures must be left to the agency, as Vermont Yankee
requires. Id. at 263 n.15.
Thus we do not prescribe the exact nature of the notice requirement nor
do we prescribe the procedure by which the ICC should provide the Milwaukee with an opportunity to be heard. We do leave these procedural
matters to the discretion of the ICC, but nevertheless require that there be
an appropriate exercise of that discretion.
Id.
The court thus required more procedural opportunities than any applicable
statute demanded or the agency desired, but without great specificity as to just what
was required.
146. See, e.g., Banks v. Federal Aviation Admin., 687 F.2d 92, 94-97 (5th Cir. 1982)
(court reluctant to require new hearing rather than reinstatement when the evidence
upon which an employee discharge was based violated due process); New Orleans
Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 659 F.2d 509, 515 (5th Cir.
1981) (court denied request for a "second duplicative evidentiary hearing" in a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission approval of contested natural gas rate-filing
settlements); Zachary v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 621 F.2d 155, 158-59
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1066 (1980) (court denied requests that thejudiciary impose an evidentiary hearing or oral argument in a Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission proceeding when there were no disputed facts); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 598 F.2d 759, 773 (3d Cir.
1979) (court denied request that the judiciary impose an adjudicatory hearing on a
Nuclear Regulatory Commission declaration of a moratorium on licensing decisions
and rulemaking concerning recycling of spent fuels); Republic Steel Corp. v. Costle,
581 F.2d 1228, 1234 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979) (court reluctant to require extensions when statutory EPA deadlines for water pollution permits
had not been met); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 582 F.2d 166, 167-75 (2d Cir. 1978) (court would not
interfere in agency denial of petition for rulemaking on permanent disposal of spent
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tablishes procedures for administrative action, whether by informal
rulemaking, formal rulemaking, or by adjuciation, and the agency does
not elect to afford more, "the courts may not override the determination
simply because they believe other procedures would be preferable."147
Kenworth Trucks of Philadelphia, Inc. v. NLRB148 illustrates a typical
application of the Vermont Yankee doctrine in the context of adjudication. The case was a rehearing to reconsider the court's pre- Vermont
Yankee decision in which it had found that the NLRB must provide an
independent statement of basis for its bargaining order, and not simply
wastes when agency preferred to address the issue in individual licensing proceedings); Kinnett Dairies, Inc. v. Farrow, 580 F.2d 1260, 1270 (5th Cir. 1978) (court
reluctant to impose procedural requirements in government procurement). In each
of these cases Vermont Yankee was cited in justifying reluctance to interfere with
the agencies' inclinations.
The courts of appeals also have considered the matter of administrative delay
in social security benefit proceedings. Some of them have invoked Vermont Yankee
in refusing to impose mandatory time limits on the adjudication of these claims. In
Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 351-56 (7th Cir. 1978), the court found that the
delays were not so unreasonable as to justify judicial intervention when, as in this
case, due process was not denied. The court noted that the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee had cautioned against courts "engrafting" their own notions of proper
procedure. [d. at 352. The court in Day v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 18, 22 (2d Cir.
1982), vacated on other grounds, Heckler v. Day, 104 S. Ct. 2249 (1984), was similarly inclined. It felt Congress had the ultimate responsibility for correcting
problems in the administration of federal programs, although it also believed there
was a role for the court when the applicable statute was not being followed. [d. at
22. See supra note 102 for a discussion of the district court cases.
147. Caulfield v. Board of Educ., 583 F.2d 605, 614-15 (2d Cir. 1978) (the applicable
statutes required a hearing only when the agency sought termination of funds, and
the court would not require a hearing and public participation before the agency
could enter a memorandum of understanding allowing the school board to assign
teachers on the basis of race).
The Interstate Commerce Commission in particular has been the object of
claims for judicially imposed procedures, which the courts of appeals generally have
rejected. See, e.g., People v. ICC, 698 F.2d 868, 872 (7th Cir. 1983) (court turned
aside requests for more intrusive administrative appellate review in a railroad abandonment proceeding); Simmons v. United States, 698 F.2d 888, 893 (7th Cir. 1983)
(court refused to intervene in the agency's decisions refusing an extension of time to
respond to new evidence, a postponement of the hearing because counsel had a
court conflict, and requiring that the administrative law judge hear "oral opposition
testimony upon remand"; court considered its role "narrow" in reviewing procedural issues, citing Vermont Yankee); People v. ICC, 687 F.2d 1047, 1057 (7th Cir.
1982) (court turned aside request for a public hearing on a decision to allow one
railroad to acquire another); Laird v. ICC, 691 F.2d 147, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1982)
(court turned aside request for an oral hearing and discovery on a petition to set
aside commission approval of a regulated carrier's reverse stock split), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 2086 (1983); American Trucking Ass'ns v. ICC, 659 F.2d 452, 460-61
(5th Cir. 1981) (review of ICC rules for informal adjudication in which the court
refused to impose more than the notice and comment afforded), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 1272 (1983); Akron, C. & Y. R.R. v. United States, 586 F.2d 29, 32 (7th Cir.
1978) (court turned aside request for more than abbreviated notice to announce
nonconcurrence in not yet effective joint rates); Crete Carrier Corp. v. United
States, 577 F.2d 49, 50 (8th Cir. 1978) (court turned aside request for an oral hearing and cross-examination on a petition to set aside a grant of operating authority).
148. 580 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1978).
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incorporate by reference the findings of the administrative law judge. 149
Here, the court reversed its earlier position.
[Although Vermont Yankee] dealt with a factual and administrative context different from that here and, in particular, involved the review of rule-making, rather than adjudicatory
procedures, it expresses the basic philosophy that agencies
should be relatively free to establish their own procedures and
mechanisms for decision-making on subjects within the scope
of their expertise. ISO
As a result, the "spirit of Vermont Yankee must be given attention," and
a separate statement of reasons would not be required. ISI
There is greater evidence in the courts of appeals than in the district
courts of a willingness to give Vermont Yankee less controlling weight.
Virtually none of those cases has involved informal rulemaking, however,
and in those cases that do involve judicial review of informal rulemaking,
most of the courts choosing not to follow Vermont Yankee have tended
to distinguish the case rather than disparage or reject it. The distinction
drawn by these latter courts is one between judicial imposition of procedures in excess of those required for informal rulemaking by § 553 of the
APA, clearly forbidden by Vermont Yankee, and a judicial requirement
149. Id. at 62.
150. Id.
151. Id. For cases in which other courts of appeals follow the Third Circuit's lead in

Kenworth Trucks, see NLRB v. Windsor Indus., Inc., 730 F.2d 860, 866 (2d Cir.
1984) (court saw "no reason to take a different view"); Bandag, Inc. v. NLRB, 583
F.2d 765, 772, & n.ll (5th Cir. 1978) (NLRB had refused to reopen a case for the
taking of evidence concerning employee turnover during the time between the administrative law judge's decision and the Board's review of that decision; reviewing
court was reluctant to impose a requirement that would "seriously interfere with
[the Board's] established procedures, noting that Vermont Yankee is a "reaffirmation of the general principle that courts of appeal should not interfere with agency
procedure." The court did observe that there may be situations where the Board
might be required to reopen "to proceed fairly," but that there was insufficient evidence to do so here); see also Big Y Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 651 F.2d 40, 48 (1st Cir.
1981) (Vermont Yankee joins Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474
(1951), as authority for the proposition that the scope of judicial review over bargaining orders is confined to a determination of whether the relevant factors have
been considered, with the weight to be given the factors left to the agency even if the
court disagrees); NLRB v. Living and Learning Centers, Inc., 652 F.2d 209, 214
(1st Cir. 1981) (same as Big Y Foods). All ofthese cases are concerned with judicial
review of NLRB adjudicatory procedures. Vermont Yankee thus seems established
as a factor in review of this agency's procedures.
Courts of appeals also have cited Vermont Yankee for the proposition that the
jUdiciary is not to interfere once it is determined that the statutory criteria have been
met for appointment of receivers for ailing financial institutions. Biscayne Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 720 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir.
1983) (citing Telegraph Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp.,
564 F. Supp. 862, 875-76 (N.D. Ill. 1981), affd sub nom. Telegraph Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Schilling, 703 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 484 (1983» (the
wisdom of the exercise of the power to appoint a receiver is not subject to reexamination under the guise of judicial review), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2656 (1984).
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that the agency's record, produced by procedures chosen by the agency,
when judicially reviewed under the appropriate standard,152 rationally
support the rule. Thus, these courts seem to say that, notwithstanding
Vermont Yankee's mandate that choice of procedure to develop the necessary record must be left to the agency, the courts retain a right of substantive review to determine whether the necessary record has been
developed. If the procedures chosen by the agency fail to produce the
necessary record, that is to provide rational support for the adoption of a
rule, the court may invalidate the rule and remand to the agency for
development of an acceptable record. The agency may then choose to
repeat the same procedures that it originally chose to use and hope that
the reviewing court will now find the record adequately supports the
agency decision, or the agency may choose to use more extensive procedures than the minimum required by § 553 of the APA, thus producing a
more extensive record, and perhaps then satisfying a reviewing court.
In National Crushed Stone Association, Inc. v. EPA,153 for example,
the Fourth Circuit reviewed EPA rules concerning the discharge of pollutants by point sources of crushed stone, sand, and gravel. The court
held the rule's suspended solids limits invalid and remanded for reconsideration. The court indicated that under Vermont Yankee the agency was
free to fashion its own procedures and that the APA imposed maximum
mandatory procedures,154 but noted that "courts are no longer satisfied
with bare administrative ipse dixits, and the Agency must make reasoned
decisions with full articulation of the reasoning and take into account all
relevant factors."155
The rule was remanded, however, both because the agency failed to
give its reasoning and because the agency failed to provide an opportunity for interested persons to respond to certain data upon which the
agency relied. 156 The first reason for remand hardly represents a rebellion against the principles of Vermont Yankee in rulemaking. Had the
court stopped there, its holding would have been consistent with Vermont Yankee. In requiring that the agency provide an opportunity for
interested persons to respond to data upon which the agency relied, however, the court overstepped the boundary set by Vermont Yankee, effectively imposing procedures upon an agency.
In National Industrial Sand Association v. Marshall,157 the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit utilized reasoning similar to that used by
the Fourth Circuit in National Crushed Stone. The court reviewed the
152. The appropriate standard for judicial review of informal rulemaking is whether the
record provides rational support for the agency decision, that is, that the decision
was not arbitrary and capricious. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
153. 601 F.2d III (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 64 (1980).
154. [d. at 116.
155. /d.
156. [d. at 118.
157. 601 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1979).

286

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 14

Secretary of Labor's training rules for mining companies and in its discussion of the scope of its review stated:
We must also be mindful of the teachings of the Supreme Court
in Vermont Yankee. . . . The principal thrust of that decision
was to discourage the courts of appeals from engrafting procedural requirements on the rulemaking standards established
under. . . the APA, 5 U.S.c. sec. 553. Beyond this, the Court
did not specifically condemn the "hard look" doctrine. 15s
Yet the court eventually upheld the rules. As did the Fourth Circuit in
National Crushed Stone, all the Third Circuit seems to have been indicating is that the primary thrust of Vermont Yankee is to control judicial
imposition of additional procedures and not the ability of the courts to
examine with care what the agency has done.
Some cases involving judicial review of administrative action other
than informal rulemaking have dealt with Vermont Yankee in similar
fashion. In East Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States,159 a
case involving review of an Interstate Commerce Commission order
granting a carrier temporary authority to carry commodities, the ICC
argued that it was not required to provide full findings and explanation of
its decision and the court could not impose such in light of Vermont
Yankee. l60 The court found that the agency still should "explain its results," that this would pose "no intolerable burden," and that:
We do not think that Vermont Yankee prevents this court from
remanding for an administrative explanation in an appropriate
case. The Court did not purport to address the principle that in
order to preserve effective review, a court should demand a reasoned decision from an administrative agency. Unlike Vermont
Yankee, the concern in this case is not with the adequacy of
administrative fact-finding but the effectiveness of judicial review. Also, the judicial intrusion in this case would be minimal: a remand would not require the ICC to reconsider the
decision it has made, but only articulate some reasons. 161
The court concluded that although the ICC's failure fully to articulate its
reasons for granting authority made review difficult, the court was nevertheless able to effectively employ the applicable scope of review,162 and
affirmed. 163
[d. at 699 n.35.
593 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1979).
[d. at 695.
[d. at 695 n.7 (dictum).
[d. at 698 (the "case [was] not an example of the administrative process at its
best.").
163. [d.; see also Saylor v. USDA, 723 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1983). In this appeal from an
adjudicatory proceeding in which the USDA suspended a registrant under the Packers and Stockyards Act, the court remanded for "lack of a clear statement of reasons" and commented, "we recognize that we may not impose procedural

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
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NLRB v. Permanent Label Corp.l64 involved a petition by the
NLRB for enforcement of its bargaining order. 165 The Third Circuit ordered enforcement, but one concurring judge, nonetheless, felt that the
majority erred in "its wrongful assumption of authority to promulgate an
essentially procedural rule" in requiring a statement of reasons in support of the bargaining order and that this ignored "the Supreme Court's
admonitions" in Vermont Yankee. 166 Other judges, concurring in part
and dissenting in part, defended the majority's requirement of a statement of reasons, noting:
Requiring the Board to articulate its reasons for imposing a
bargaining order does not represent an unwarranted judicial interference with administrative procedure. . . . This basic requirement which focuses on effective judicial review cannot be
deemed to constitute an undue burden on the Board, and does
not intrude upon internal Board procedures in a manner proscribed by the principle expressed in Vermont Yankee. 167

164.

165.
166.
167.

requirements in excess of those demanded by the APA. Vermont Yankee.
However, the Supreme Court recently made clear that Vermont Yankee was not
meant to abrogate the responsibility of agencies to 'cogently explain' their decisions.
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., - U.S. - 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2869-71, 77 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1983)." [d. at 584;
accord Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1496-97 (9th Cir. 1984) (use of injunctive
relief to control methods of determining social security benefits "does not raise issues of judicial interference in administrative agencies' discretion to formulate their
own procedures" because here the question is one of the "executive branch defying
the courts"); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Marsh, 721 F.2d 767, 784-86 (11th Cir.
1983) ("The applicable procedure established by the Corps within the meaning of
Vermont Yankee is one of contemporaneous application for aU required permits";
therefore, the court was not interfering with established procedures or imposing
additional ones); Artukovic v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 693 F.2d 894,
897-99 (9th Cir. 1982) (reopening rather than reconsideration was required under
due process to afford hearing in revocation of stay of deportation, notwithstanding
deference to the agency's procedural rules under Vermont Yankee).
657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982). But see Kenworth
Trucks of Philadelphia, Inc. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 55, 62-63 (3d Cir. 1978) (court
indicated that although Vermont Yankee "dealt with a factual and administrative
context different from that here and, in particular, involved the review of rule-making rather than adjudicatory procedures . . . ," the court nevertheless felt constrained by the "spirit of Vermont Yankee" to impose a separate statement of
reasons requirement in bargaining order proceedings).
Permanent Label Corp., 657 F.2d at 512.
[d. at 522-24.
[d. at 532 (Garth, Hunter, Weiss, J.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see
also Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981) (court concluded that the
administrative law judge, in denying an application for concurrent social security
benefits, must indicate the evidence rejected as well as make findings upon the evidence received. The dissent believed that Congress should provide the standard,
and, invoking Vermont Yankee, stated: "I do not agree with the majority's attempt
to 'engraft [its] own notions of proper procedure upon [this agency which is] entrusted with substantive functions by Congress.''' [d. at 708 (Garth, J., dissenting in
part». In a subsequent bargaining order case, Judge Garth dissented again, noting
that "Judge Adams [sic] reliance on Vermont Yankee to support his and the majority's position that the Board should not be required to do more than it did here is a
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Yet, in each of these cases it cannot be said that Vermont Yankee
was brushed aside. Perhaps the most significant aspect of East Texas
Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States 168 and NLRB v. Permanent
Label Corp. 169 is that neither involved judicial review of agency rulemaking. The judicial review in these cases was of adjudications. Vermont
Yankee, on its facts, involves judicial review only of rulemaking, not of
adjudication. 170 The East Texas Motor Freight Lines and Permanent Label courts therefore might have found Vermont Yankee inapplicable to
judicial review of adjudication, and hence felt free to impose procedures
upon agencies for their adjudications. Yet, they did not do so, but indeed
were careful to avoid judicial imposition of procedure upon agency adjudications. These courts thus implicitly held that the Vermont Yankee rule
applies, not only to judicial review of rulemaking, but also to judicial
review of adjudication. Thus, these cases, like the rulemaking cases of
National Crushed Stone Association, Inc. v. EPA 171 and National Industrial Sand Association v. Marshall172 drew a distinction between the forbidden judicial imposition of procedures upon an agency, and the courts'
right, upon review of an agency decision, to demand an adequate record
that rationally supports the agency decision. These cases, therefore, cannot be said to represent resistance to Vermont Yankee, and are examples
of the much more common phenomenon, that of citing Vermont Yankee
where it is probably neither required nor necessary. 173 Thus, the picture

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

misapplication of the principles prescribed by the Supreme Court in that case. In
Vermont Yankee the Supreme Court held that reviewing courts could not compel
administrative agencies engaged in rulemaking to adopt procedures prescribed by a
court in addition to those provided in the Administrative Procedure Act. In the
instant action, the issue is whether this court should require the Board to provide us
with a sufficient explanation and articulation for its choice of remedy - i.e., a bargaining order - in h dispute resolved through adjudication." NLRB v. Eastern
Steel Co., 671 F.2d 104, 115 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982) (Garth, I., dissenting).
593 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1979).
657 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982).
See supra notes 6-20 and accompanying text.
601 F.2d III (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449 U.S. 64 (1980).
601 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1979).
For another example of a court of appeals citing Vermont Yankee when it is unnecessary, see Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978). In Caswell, the court
agreed with a district court order requiring that social security disability hearings be
held within 90 days of a request. Although the court conceded that the agency has
discretion in setting hearings, that the applicable statutes did not define what is a
reasonable time, that Congress had not said that the delays at issue were unreasonable, and that Congress "must bear the ultimate responsibility for remedying
problems in the administration of federal programs . . . under Vermont Yankee," it
said that the jUdiciary still has a role that includes devising appropriate remedies.
Thus, it was willing to support judicial imposition of time limits on these agency
proceedings. [d. at 15-17. See also Day v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 19, 22 (2d Cir.
1982), vacated, Heckler v. Day, 104 S. Ct. 2249 (1984); cf Mental Health Ass'n v.
Heckler, 720 F.2d 965, 972 (8th Cir. 1983) (The court was "well aware that in
formulating equitable relief the courts must proceed gingerly and not encroach on
traditional administrative practices," but courts may fashion "relief commensurate
to the harm. ").
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in the courts of appeals other than the D.C. Circuit is similar to that in
the district courts.
C.

"The D. C. Circuit"

One of the early commentaries on Vermont Yankee was written by
Judge Anton Scalia, now of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 174 His article was sharply critical of his future colleagues
on that court which, he observed, "had been, to put it mildly, a remarkably ineffective instrument for implementing the underlying principles of
interpretation which the [pre-Vermont Yankee] Supreme Court opinions
[in administrative law] quite clearly expressed."17s He believed "the
[Supreme] Court felt, as an institution, that its authority had been
flouted," and that Vermont Yankee was intended to deal with the
problem. 176
Judge Scalia examined the early evidence of the D.C. Circuit's response and reaction to Vermont Yankee, and concluded at the time that
it "flouts the Supreme Court's guidance . . . . "177 He commented: "A
tongue-lashing having failed, it will be interesting to see what further
steps the Supreme Court may take to bring the D.C. Circuit into line."178
Examination of post-Vermont Yankee decisions of the Supreme
Court, as indicated previously, discloses that it has done little more than
confirm the general principles of the opinion. 179 There is no indication
that the Court has taken particular offense at what has transpired in the
lower federal judiciary in general, or in the D.C. Circuit in particular.
The explanation for this may be that later treatment of Vermont Yankee
by the D.C. Circuit reveals patterns of neither wanton disregard nor
cheerful obedience. In that regard the judicial record in the D.C. Circuit
is mixed, yet it is qualitatively distinct from that in the district courts and
the other courts of appeals.
The D.C. Circuit reacted to Vermont Yankee and its implications in
a variety of ways. It has followed it, distinguished it, debated it, and, on
occasion, undermined it. For example, in remanding a rate-making or174. Scalia, supra note 38.
175. [d. at 363.
176. [d. at 370-71; see Friendly, Book Review, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 471, 482 (1980)
(reviewing K.C. DAVIS, 1 & 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (2d ed. 1978,
1979) (Judge Friendly described Vermont Yankee as the "Supreme Court's resentment of the hubris of the District of Columbia Circuit's imposing procedural requirements on informal rulemaking beyond those specified in the APA"); Note,
Administrative Law - Vermont Yankee "Maximum Procedural Requirements" Rule,
27 U. KAN. L. REV. 500, 508 (1979) (Vermont Yankee in its "narrowest sense" was
a "letter to Judge Bazelon" of the D.C. Circuit, "as an unequivocal rejection of the
role he envisioned for the courts").
177. Scalia, supra note 38, at 396-99. Judge Scalia focused on the decision in United
States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See
infra text accompanying notes 301-10 for a discussion of this case.
178. Scalia, supra note 38, at 400.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 41-55.
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der to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission for failure to apply
the proper legal criteria, Judge Leventhal offered a number of suggestions
as to how the agency might exercise its discretion in selecting alternative
procedures,180 and emphasized:
that while the court has identified a number of factors for consideration by the Commission, it is aware that the appraisal and
weighing of these factors is the function of the agency and not
the court. It is not an encroachment on the agency's ultimate
discretion either that the court has identified a number of factors for consideration or . . . a particular emphasis should be
given a certain factor. 181
In another opinion reviewing a challenge to a Federal Maritime
Commission order after remand, in part because of the agency's refusal
to consider events subsequent to its initial order, Judge Wright observed:
We emphasize that our earlier opinion expressly stated that the
Commission had no duty to provide full "evidentiary" hearings. We have no wish to straightjacket the agency with procedural requirements unrelated to its responsibilities. Still, the
Commission must perform its duties with a full understanding
of the economic and commercial situation. We cannot find that
the Order on Remand, reached without consideration of thencurrent industry conditions or agency policy, was based on a
review of relevant factors. 182
In both cases the court reviewed agency action with an eye to Vermont
Yankee, but without abdicating all judicial responsibilities.
The course of Vermont Yankee upon remand is perhaps the best
example of the possibility of continuing confrontation between the D.C.
Circuit and the Supreme Court. Judge Bazelon, writing for the majority,
stated that Vermont Yankee "held that if an agency complies with the
procedures required by statute, a rule may be struck down because of
procedural shortcomings only in unusual circumstances. The Supreme
Court agreed, however, that the Rule should be vacated if it lacks support in the administrative record . . . . "183 He said that the court's duty
was only to review the rules "on their faces - not the procedures that
produced them" and that he was not jUdging whether nuclear power was
good or bad. 184 The court nevertheless found the rules invalid for failure
180. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1094,
1119-21 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980).
181. Id. at 1121.
182. Seatrain Int'l, S.A. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 598 F.2d 289, 295 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
183. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
184. Id. at 475 n.75.
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to consider certain matters, including health and socioeconomic issues,
as well as the cumulative effects of fuel cycle activity.18s
The appearance is one of consistency with Vermont Yankee; that
the judge received the Supreme Court's "letter to Judge Bazelon."186
Judge Wilkey dissented. He commented that Judge Bazelon adopted, for
the majority, the "too hard a look" doctrine and "if there was ever a
doubt prior to today, it is now clear this court is committed to an assumed role as high public protector of all that is good from perceived
evils of nuclear power."187 He felt that Judge Bazelon was looking to
assess procedural compliance and in the process dictated "just how this
consideration is best made."188 He concluded that the court "has taken
no more than a great step sideways from an analysis rejected unanimously by the Supreme Court" in Vermont Yankee and [has] "effectively
taken over control of the nuclear industry."189
Perhaps the conflict between the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit concerning the proper role of the judiciary in the review of administrative action continues. The more complete judicial record merits
examination.
In a case in which the D.C. Circuit reviewed EPA rules on the issuance of orders for primary nonferrous smelters it was asked to order
cross-examination of an economist. It declined on the basis of Vermont
Yankee and stated that the "Supreme Court has made clear . . . that
courts must be particularly reticent about going beyond the procedures
established by Congress and in requiring agencies to provide additional
rulemaking procedures." 190
Several other decisions of the D.C. Circuit reveal similar acceptance
of the case without evidence of overt resistance. One issue in a challenge
to the Civil Aeronautics Board's rules on domestic air cargo transport
was whether the Board had allowed adequate time for oral argument.
The court had no difficulty concluding that, in light of Vermont Yankee,
"there is no basis for requiring the Board to go beyond the requirements
of the APA."191
In another case involving the EPA's standards for lead in ambient
185. Id. at 494.
186. Note, supra note 177, at 508.
187. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459,517 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Wilkey, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom.
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 103 S. Ct. 2246
(1983).
188. /d. at 537.
189. Id. at 545; see also Public Sys. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d
973,984 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Robb, J., dissenting) ("The thesis of the majority is untenable in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Vermont Yankee . . . . ").
190. Kennecott Corp. v. EPA, 684 F.2d 1007, 1020 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court was
influenced by the fact that Congress had considered and rejected cross-examination
in this type of EPA rulemaking. Id.
191. National Small Shipments Traffic Conference v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 618 F.2d
819,834 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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air, the court was unwilling to order the agency to allow cross-examination of medical and scientific witnesses who had testified at the public
hearing held on the proposed rules. 192 Vermont Yankee has had a similar
influence in cases involving efforts to have the court impose separation of
function requirements,193 cost/benefit analysis,194 additional procedures
with respect to agency subpoenas,195 mandatory inclusion of related issues in a single rulemaking proceeding,196 reopening, and limitations on
ex parte contacts. 197
One area in which Vermont Yankee has had noticeable impact upon
the D.C. Circuit is in that of exempt rulemaking. The idea that courts
could impose notice-and-comment procedures in the promulgation of
rules otherwise exempt from the procedural requirements of § 553 of the
APA had been applied, before Vermont Yankee, when the rule was
deemed to have "substantial impact on the rights and interests of private
parties."198 Vermont Yankee has led the D.C. Circuit to conclude that
this form of judical activism is no longer permissible. In Cabais v. Egger ,199 the court observed that "substantial impact" is an insufficent justification to require notice and comment if a rule is otherwise exempt,
and that it is not "an independent basis for determining the applicability
of APA procedures. . . ."200 In Cabais, most of the agency's directive
was found to be interpretative, and therefore not subject to notice and
comment by the explicit terms of § 553 of the APA.201 The court
reached the same result in American Postal Workers Union v. United
States Postal Service. 202 It declined to apply the "substantial impact"
test/°3 and "decline[d] to require OPM to engage in procedures not required by the APA" in light of Vermont Yankee. 204 The court would do
192. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1169-71 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1042 (1980).
193. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1212-14 (D.C. Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
194. American Fed'n of Labor v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 665 n.167 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
("[T]his court may not require OSHA to conduct cost-benefit analysis unless the
agency or Congress officially requires the procedure. Such analysis is certainly not
mandated in explicit terms by the statute. Nor is it implicated in the extra-statutory
procedures OSHA followed . . . . "), affd in part. rev'd in part sub nom. American
Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981).
195. FTC v. Brigadier Indus. Corp., 613 F.2d 1110, 1115-16 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
196. Earth Resources Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 617 F.2d 775, 777-79
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (claim was that consideration of one issue in the present rulemaking proceeding would render later hearings on other issues meaningless).
197. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 397-404 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
198. Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 708 n.83 (D.C. Cir. 1980). See supra text
accompanying notes 63-73, and 112-18 for a discussion of the recent course of the
"substantial impact" test in the district courts and other courts of appeals.
199. 690 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
200. Id. at 237.
201. Id. at 237-38.
202. 707 F.2d 548 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1594 (1984).
203. Id. at 560.
204. Id. at 565 n.11.
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no more than suggest that notice and comment was "advisable,"
although not required. 205
Today the expected result is that once the determination is made
that a rule is exempt, the inquiry ends-that is, the court will not impose
notice and comment. 206 Stewart v. Smith concerned a challenge to the
Bureau of Prisons's policy of considering only persons under the age of
thirty-five for jobs within correctional facilities. 207 One assertion was
that the policy was procedurally defective because it had not been
promulgated by notice and comment procedures. The court concluded
that the policy was exempt, stating: "The desirability of procedural safeguards. . . is not the issue in this case. Instead the question before us is
simply whether the APA required notice and comment rulemaking when
this policy was formulated. If it did not, we cannot invalidate this maximum age rule. See Vermont Yankee . . . . "208
At the other end of the spectrum, the D.C. Circuit will not hesitate
to perform traditional judicial functions in the review of rulemaking.
Because the Commission intimates that its procedural decisions
are insulated by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Vermont Yankee . . . it is worth noting the holding in that case
. . . . Thus the case restricts the ability of courts to refashion
normal rulemaking procedures with judicially-conceived notions of administrative fair play. It has no bearing on the
power of courts to interpret and apply congressional
directives. 209
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit will not allow, for example,
assertions of the principles of Vermont Yankee to bar it from performance of the traditional functions of judicial review. If an agency's explanation of the basis for its decision is inadequate or fails to address
alternatives that it reasonably should have, the court will remand for
further consideration,210 notwithstanding that Vermont Yankee does not
allow the court the "power to contest the rationality of the substantive
decisions . . . . "211
205. Id. at 564-65.
206. See infra text accompanying notes 273-77 for a discussion of Batterton v. Marshall,
648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980) in which Judge Bazelon found it unnecessary to
reject the "substantial impact" test and suggested it may still provide a basis for
analysis of the question of availability of a statutory exemption.
207. 673 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
208. Id. at 496 n.37. Judge Wright dissented on the ground that the policy did not fall
within the APA exemption for "matter[s] relating to agency management or personnel." Id. at 500-06.
209. Association of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC, 617 F.2d 611, 619 n.lO (D.C. Cir.
1979) (issue of propriety of ex parte contacts in rulemaking not ripe for judicial
review).
210. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 815-17
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (repeal of rule containing restrictions on "homework" in the knitted outerwear business).
211. Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413,
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The AP A itself may provide the basis for such decisions, since it
requires a statement of basis and purpose with the final rule. 212 If the
court is simply carrying out the intent of Congress as expressed by the
AP A's requirement of a statement of basis and purpose, then there is no
conflict with Vermont Yankee. 213
The more difficult and interesting aspects of response and reaction
to Vermont Yankee in the D.C. Circuit lie between those cases in which
Vermont Yankee clearly has been followed and those in which it clearly
need not be. Here is where one is likely to discover, if at all, the resistance which Judge Scalia predicted and lamented. 214
The exceptions to Vermont Yankee 215 have been considered by the
court in several cases. In Lead Industries Association v. EPA,216 one challenge involved the agency's denial of cross-examination of medical and
scientific witnesses who testified at the hearing on the EPA's proposed
rules. 217 The court rejected the argument that it should intervene on the
basis of the Vermont Yankee exceptions. Judge Wright observed that the
petitioner has an "extremely heavy burden in its attempt to persuade the
court to impose on EPA a procedure that is not required by statute" and
that it is "absolutely clear that courts must be extremely reticent."218
In another claim for additional requirements in rulemaking, Judge
Wright again discussed the Vermont Yankee exceptions. In this instance,
the assertion was that Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) staff attorneys who were advocates for an OSHA rule had been
consulted by the decisionmaker in development of the final rule. 219 The
court examined the AP A and the OSHA enabling statute and could "discern no statutory basis in either the AP A or the Occupational Safety and
Health Act for a separation of function requirement in OSHA rulemak-

212.

213.

214.
215.

216.
217.
218.

219.

1440 n.86 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (remanded in part for the agency to give adequate consideration to the issue of elimination of program logs.).
Independent United States Tanker Owners Comm. v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 918-20
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1024 n.ll (D.C. Cir.
1978); Note, The Need For an Additional Notice and Comment Period When Final
Rules Differ Substantially from Interim Rules, 1981 DUKE L. J. 377,388 (Vermont
Yankee does not preclude imposition of additional procedures in furtherance of section 553 purposes).
California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981), offers a combination of the
issues of adequacy of the statement of reasons and of exempt rulemaking. It was
argued that the AP A required more stringent and independent findings than the
underlying statute, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The court disagreed,
noting that the underlying statute did have a reasons requirement, that it saw "no
need to engraft other provisions onto those found in this comprehensive statute,"
and that the rules were in any event exempt from the AP A in that they related to
public property. Id. at 1322 n.154.
See supra text accompanying notes 174-78.
See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).
Id. at 1169-71 (rules concerned lead in ambient air).
Id. at 1169.
United steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
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ing, and under the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee, that is
virtually the end of the inquiry."220 The judge noted that this finding
does not end the matter entirely if due process rights are violated or if
there are" 'extremely compelling circumstances' in which the courts remain free to impose nonconsitutional extra-statutory procedures on
agencies."221 Nevertheless, the court was not inclined to explore the exceptions; rather, it looked to the Home Box Office - U.S. Lines precedents,222 which it felt had survived Vermont Yankee, distinguished those
cases on the ground that neither involved improper influence or ex parte
contacts with agency staff members and the decisionmakers, and concluded that the rule was procedurally correct. 223

Lead Industries Association and United Steelworkers of America v.
Marsha1l 224 illustrate that the D.C. Circuit has neither invoked nor
probed the exceptions to Vermont Yankee as a means of achieving what
the Supreme Court prohibited. Further evidence of this can be found in
cases concerning other EPA rules,22s Federal Energy Regulatory Commission design specifications for the Alaskan natural gas transmission
system,226 and directives concerning statutory requirements that states
offset unemployment compensation payments by the amount of pension
or retirement benefits received by unemployed claimants. 227
One possible means of limiting the impact of Vermont Yankee is to
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 1212-14.
Id. at 1214.
See generally infra text accompanying notes 278-316.
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
224.Id.
225. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court stated that it would
reverse only if "the statutory requirements, or the procedures reasonably inferable
from them or from basic notions of constitutional due process were breached by
EPA" or there were substantial departures from statutory requirements. Id. at 392.
It noted the general rule that there are no due process constraints in rulemaking, id.
at 392 n.462, and refused to interfere with respect to comments received during the
post-comment period, EPA's refusal to reopen the comment period, ex parte contacts with persons outside the agency, and intra-Executive branch meetings. Id. at
397408.
226. Earth Resources Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 617 F.2d 775 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). In the face of a claimed deprivation of due process because the agency
decided certain issues in rulemaking in isolation from related issues, the court concluded that no protected liberty or property interest had been identified and small
numbers of persons were not individually affected so as to justify invoking due process in rulemaking. Id. at 777-79. It observed:
Complainants' contention of 'piecemeal adjudication' does not actually
state a due process claim, but rather an attack on the Commission's choice
to structure its proceedings on an issue-by-issue basis. The Supreme Court
has affirmed in the clearest terms that agencies have broad discretion to
fashion their own procedures.
Id. at 778.
227. Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The court was not willing to find
that constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances justified the
imposition of notice and comment procedures in exempt rulemaking. Id. at 237 n.2.
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construe it narrowly and confine it to its facts. The D.C. Circuit has
done so on occasion. In Las Cruces TV Cable v. FCC,228 which involved
an agency acting in an adjudicatory context, the court put Vermont Yankee to the side by noting that the case warned the courts not to impose
procedures beyond those required by the AP A or desired by the agency
in informal rulemaking and that, consequently, the case was not dispositive. 229 The court, however, still took from Vermont Yankee the guidance that it "serves to caution us against instructing the agency how to
adjudicate a refund dispute without good reason. "230
Geller v. FCC23! presents a somewhat more subtle limitation of Vermont Yankee, one which may reveal inconsistency. Geller involved
rulemaking, but the concern was not the internal workings of the process
following proposal of the rule; rather, the issue was the FCC's denial of a
rulemaking petition. The petitioner wanted the agency to reconsider,
through rulemaking, an existing rule on cable television policies that he
felt was no longer in the public interest because of changed circumstances. 232 The FCC denied the petition, but the court disagreed and
ordered "that the Commission must reexamine the regulatory remnants
of the consensus agreement [the original rule] for some discernable contribution to the public interest, and we leave to the Commission in the
first instance the procedures through which that will be done."233 The
Geller court made clear that it did "not mean to imply that this inquiry
must necessarily be conducted in a new rulemaking proceeding
. . . . "234 Concerning Vermont Yankee, it commented, "we do not encounter the strictures on imposition of judicially-created requirements on
the rulemaking process recently highlighted in . . . " that case. 235
The court in Geller thus alleviated the "Vermont Yankee problem"
by confining the Vermont Yankee rule to prohibition of judicial interference only with the internal workings of the rulemaking process. The
court's insistence that it was not requiring any particular procedural approach that the agency should follow on remand had the same effect. Its
suggestion, however, that the choice belongs to the agency "in the first
instance" seems inconsistent with the implication of Vermont Yankee
that such choices are for Congress in the first instance, the agency in the
last instance, and the courts nowhere in between. The effect of the Geller
228. 645 F.2d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
229. Id. at 1049.
230.Id.
231. 610 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
232. Id. at 976.
233. Id. at 980 n.59 (emphasis added).
234.Id.
235. Id. at 980 n.58; see also ITT Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 699 F.2d 1219, 1245-46
(1983) (In considering denial of a petition for rulemaking, the court distinguished
between issues of discretion in fashioning additional rulemaking procedures, the
agency's province under Vermont Yankee, and issues of statutory compliance in
which die court has the responsibility of a more "exacting" review), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
1936 (1984).
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decision is to compel an agency "to exercise its discretion" to take an
action that the agency does not consider necessary and desirable. The
technique of limiting Vermont Yankee to its facts is an effective means for
the court to retain an active, meaningful role in judicial review of agency
decision making. Yet neither this technique nor its result - retaining a
meaningful judicial review - seems judicially presumptuous.
In contrast, there have been numerous occasions in which the D.C.
Circuit has examined and applied perceived notions of Vermont Yankee
outside the context of informal rulemaking, and has in no sense limited
the reach of the Vermont Yankee rule. In these cases, the court has done
the opposite; this represents as much cooperation with the "spirit" of
Vermont Yankee as one could reasonably expect, and more. Vermont
Yankee has been cited as authority for a decision declining to require
additional procedures with respect to the issuance of protective orders by
the Federal Trade Commission,236 for a decision reversing a district
court's imposition of additional procedures in the Federal Aviation Administration's approval of a television antenna,237 and for a decision refusing to impose additional procedures in the process of administrative
approval of Postal Service rate increases. 238 There are many other such
examples in the D.C. Circuit that implement the view extracted from
Vermont Yankee that it is "well-settled that administrative agencies enjoy a broad discretion in the manner of carrying out their statutory functions and responsibilities,"239 including in cases outside the context of
236. Exxon Corp. v. FrC, 665 F.2d 1274, 1278-79 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (The court rejected
the argument that an administrative law judge could not exercise the agency's protective order authority: "Provided the Commission's procedure for the issuance of
protective orders is consistent with the governing statutes and the Constitution, as is
patent in this case, it is not subject to further judicial review."); FrC v. Anderson,
631 F.2d 741,746 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (court dismissed arguments challenging the adequacy of a protective order and noted that "formulation of procedural rules is
within the discretion of the agency, and our review is limited to determining consistency with governing statutes and the Constitution"); accord FrC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (District court erred in
imposing conditions on FrC subpoenas: "Agencies are free to determine their own
procedures as long as they do not violate constitutional or statutory safeguards.").
237. Aircraft Owners and Pilots Ass'n v. Federal Aviation Admin., 600 F.2d 965, 970
n.25 (D.C. CiT. 1979) (district court's remand in adjudication to require additional
procedures "indirectly" violates the procedural discretion that Congress placed in
the agency: "Additionally, requiring procedural safeguards not statutorily mandated violates the Supreme Court's prohibition . . . " in Vermont Yankee).
238. National Ass'n of Greeting Card Publishers v. United States Postal Serv., 607 F.2d
392,421 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Tamm, J., concurring) (court must decline "to add
the judicial veneer of a non-statutory requirement that the Governor find a PRC
decision 'wholly acceptable' in order to approve it" and "may not require more than
the minimum statutory procedures or impose procedures designed to achieve the
'best' result"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980).
239. Swinomish Tribal Community v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 627 F.2d
499 (D.C. CiT. 1980). The agency had approved amendment of a license permitting
a municipal utility to raise the height of its dam, and initiated a separate proceeding
to consider downstream consequences. The intervenors argued that the latter issue
should have been addressed by reopening the initial proceeding rather than by open-
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informal rulemaking. 24O
There is, however, more evidence of resistance to Vermont Yankee
in the D.C. Circuit than in either the district courts or the other courts of
appeals. Thus, the cases just described do not present the entire picture
for proceedings other than rulemaking. In Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,241 the court remanded a
ratemaking order because the agency had failed to apply the appropriate
legal criteria. 242 In the portion of the opinion devoted to "Latitude on
Remand," the court indicated that the agency had the discretion under
the applicable statute "to use its equitable discretion and to choose alternative procedures or mechanisms to formulate and to effectuate its judgement."243 Yet, the court then proceeded to offer a variety of suggestions
as to how the agency might exercise its discretion,244 emphasizing:
that while the court has identified a number of factors for consideration by the Commission, it is aware that the appraisal and
ing a separate and subsequent proceeding. Id. at 509·10. Judge Wald, in dissent,
agreed that Vermont Yankee cautions that fundamental policy questions are for
Congress and not for the courts. He nevertheless felt that the court could not meet
its responsibility to review for consistency with legislative intent when "the decision
itself was splintered" in more than one proceeding. Id. at 517-18.
240. City of Ukiah v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 729 F.2d 793, 799 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (dictum) (evidentiary hearing was not required in issuance of an order allowing a county water authority to study the feasibility of operating a hydroelectric
facility); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 707
F.2d 1507, 1512 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (agency refused to waive its rule to allow
automatic rate adjustments, and the court observed that "while we lack authority to
command an agency to afford a petitioner a procedural opportunity not required by
law, see Vermont Yankee . .. , the agency itself is not similarly limited."); North
Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (in an injunction
proceeding involving lease of federal oil and gas properties, the court noted that
"the Supreme Court [in Vermont Yankee] has warned of the impropriety offederal
courts introducing additional procedural or substantive standards into statutory
provisions for administrative action."); Carolina, C. & o. Ry. v. ICC, 593 F.2d
1305, 1313 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (in ICC ratemaking, the court "contemplate[d]
that the Commission will devise appropriately expedited procedures to avoid all
escapable delay," although choice of hearing procedures was within the discretion
of the agency "in the first instance"); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("[A]s a general rule, the agency, not
the court, enlarges the minimum procedures prescribed by statute."); Porter County
Chapter of the Izaak Walton League of Am., Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n,
606 F.2d 1363, 1369 n.15, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (in refusing to intervene in the
agency's decision not to institute license revocation proceedings, the court, citing
Vermont Yankee, noted that the agency has wide discretion in such matters); In re
FfC Line of Business Report Litigation, 595 F.2d 685, 695-96, 696-97 n.55 (D.C.
Cir.) ("The Commission exercised its discretion to permit greater procedural access
to the decision-making process . . . than was required" in a proceeding that was
investigatory and neither an adjudication nor a rulemaking), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
959 (1978).
241. 606 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 920 (1980).
242.Id.
243. Id. at 1119.
244. Id. at 1120.
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weighing of these factors is the function of the agency and not
the court. It is not an encroachment on the agency's ultimate
discretion either that the court has identified a number of factors for consideration . . . or a particular emphasis should be
given a certain factor.245
The practical effect of the court's "suggestions" may well be to require
indirectly what the court appears to feel it may not do directly without
running counter to Vermont Yankee.
In other cases, the D.C. Circuit has been more direct. In Independent U.S. Tanker Owners Commission v. Lewis,246 both the informal
rulemaking and adjudicatory actions of the Maritime Administration
were challenged. 247 On the informal adjUdication aspects of the case, the
court noted "the distinct and steady trend of the courts has been to demand in informal adjudications procedures similar to those already required in informal rulemaking. "248 It went on to point out that
notwithstanding Vermont Yankee's dictum "that courts may not add to
the procedural requirements of the APA except in 'extremely rare' circumstances, we are justified in demanding some sort of procedures for
notice, comment, and a statement of reasons as a necessary means of
carrying out our responsibility for a thorough and searching review. 249
In Koniag, Inc. v. Andrus,250 the court relied on due process and the
dictates of the underlying statute to reach a similar conclusion. 251 In
Koniag, the Secretary of the Interior had decided that certain Alaskan
villages were not entitled to lands and funds. The Secretary had considered the recommended decisions of the administrative law judge and the
agency's appeal board and reached his decision before the recommendations were made available to the parties. 252 Even though this proceeding
was not subject to the AP A's requirements mandating an opportunity for
comment and exceptions to the recommendations prior to the Secretary's
final decision, the court nevertheless concluded that denial of these opportunities was improper. 253 Concerning Vermont Yankee, it stated:
The Supreme Court's recent decision . . . does not require a
different result. In that case, the Court held that a reviewing
court may not dictate to an agency the methods and procedures
to be followed to develop an adequate record for judicial review
. . . . Our holding today does not trench upon this principle.
We hold only that the Secretary's secret review process is in245. Id. at 1121.
246. 690 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
247.Id.
248. Id. at 922.
249. Id. at 923.
250. 580 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 608.
253. Id. at 609.

300

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 14

consistent with both constitutional constraints and the mandate
of ANCSA [Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act] that Natives
participate as fully as possible in the decisionmaking. 254
In Citizens for a Better Environment v. Gorsuch,255 the court considered the effect of Vermont Yankee in connection with judicial authority
over consent decrees. 256 The district court had denied a motion to vacate
a settlement agreement, and one issue on appeal was whether, by making
the agreement itself, the court had improperly infringed upon the
agency's discretion. 257 Specifically, the charge was that the district
court's judicial decree dictated the approach to be taken in promulgating
rules. 258
The court found the decree to be largely the doing of the EPA and
not the district court, that the latter's role had been confined to determining that the decree was fair and consistent with the statute, and that this
did not conflict with Vermont Yankee. 259 Judge Wilkey, in dissent, said
the power to adopt consent decrees is limited by statute, and that Vermont Yankee precludes judicial prescription of rules of procedure; thus,
the majority had condoned "government by consent decree."260
It should be noted, however, that these cases and some others261
that seem to set Vermont Yankee aside arose outside the confines of informal rulemaking procedures. In such cases there is danger of mistak254. Id. at 610. Although the court did not explicitly make the point, it may have been
acting consistently with Vermont Yankee under the theory of the "constitutional
constraints" exception. It did quote the pertinent language from the Supreme
Court's opinion. Id.
255.718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2668 (1984).
256.Id.
257. Id. at 1120.
258. Id. at 1127.
259. Id. at 1128.
260. Id. at 1131, 1137.
261. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 660 F.2d
773, 776-77 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (In a case challenging certain agreements
between state and national political party committees, the majority found that the
agreements violated the applicable statute, notwithstanding the agency's interpretation. In dissent, Judge Wilkey observed: "The penchant of this court to give no
deference whatsoever to the responsible agency's interpretation of its role and basic
statute has been noted with acerbity by the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee
. . . . " Id. at 782 n.2.), rev'd, 454 U.S. 27 (1981); Seatrain Int'l, S.A. v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n, 598 F.2d 289, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ("We emphasize that our
earlier opinion expressly stated that the Commission had no duty to provide full
'evidentiary' hearings. We have no wish to straight-jacket the agency with procedural requirements unrelated to its responsibilities. Still, the Commission must perform its duties with a full understanding of the economic and commercial situation.
We cannot find that the Order on Remand, reached without consideration of thencurrent industry conditions or agency policy, was based on a review of all relevant
factors."); Public Servo Comm'n V. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 589 F.2d
542, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Robb, J., dissenting) (dissent asserted that the majority
had involved itself in matters of policy which were the province of the agency and
not the court, and which "were settled by the Commission when it established the
optional procedure" in its order approving a certificate for a natural gas producer).
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ing a legitimate distinction of inapposite precedent for resistance. This
risk does not exist in certain D.C. Circuit rulemaking cases in which
Vermont Yankee has been considered, and in those cases one can find
evidence that the court, or at least some of its members, may be inclined
to question the Supreme Court's teaching, and perhaps challenge its leadership in developing the law in this area.
Weyerhauser v. Costle 262 upheld the EPA's rules limiting effluent
discharges, with the exception of certain rules pertaining to the paper
industry.263 Yet the court's opinion is laden with philosophic conflict
with Vermont Yankee, which is a product of its perception of the general
role of a court in judicial review of rulemaking. Thus, it suggested that a
court may review procedures in rulemaking to make certain that they are
"ample enough to support their substantive cargo."264
Even more so than our review of EPA's statutory interpretations, our review of its procedural integrity in promulgating the
regulations before us is the product of our independent judgment, and our main reliance in ensuring that, despite its broad
discretion, the Agency has not acted unfairly or in disregard of
its statutorily prescribed procedures. . . . Our assertion of judicial independence in carrying out the procedural aspect of the
review function derives from the country's historical reliance
on the courts as the exponents of procedural fairness . . . .
Recently, this reliance has transcended cases arising under
either of the due process clauses and has infused modem notions of administrative law, in particular in the area of informal
rulemaking. . . .
Our reliance on careful procedural review, moreover, derives from an expectation that if the Agency, in carrying out its
'essentially legislative task,' has infused the administrative process with the degree of openness, explanation, and participatory
democracy required by the AP A, it will thereby have "negate[d] the dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality in the formulation of rules . . . . Even here, however, beyond the
notice, comment, and explanation requirements of section 553
of the AP A, it is generally up to the Agency to select among
the myriad available techniques to accomplish the goal of public understanding and participation. Vermont Yankee . ... 265
In this setting Vermont Yankee seems more afterthought and counterpoint than it does controlling precedent. 266
262. 590 F.2d lOll (D.C. Cir. 1978).
263.Id.
264. Id. at 1024 n.ll.
265. Id. at 1027-28 (citations omitted).
266. National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416 (D.C. Cir. 1980), also involved judicial
review of EPA rules, in this instance new discharge source performance standards.
The court found insufficient support in the rulemaking record and a need for a more
adequate explanation. It indicated that the scope of its review "does not presage
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Judge Bazelon's decision in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,267 Vermont Yankee on
remand to the D.C. Circuit, and Judge Wilkey's dissent were discussed in
the introduction to this section. 268 Judge Wilkey had suggested that the
majority had adopted the "too hard a look" doctrine, in conflict with
Vermont Yankee. 269 This was not the first time a colleague had accused
the majority of taking "too hard a look" at the agency's rulemaking record. In Public Systems v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,270 the
court remanded an agency rule for failure to assess the implications of its
actions and for failure adequately to explain its purposes. 271 Judge Robb
dissented:
The court reaches its conclusion by asserting that 'substantial
evidence' must support the 'factual predicate' on which the
Commission rule is promulgated. It then invalidates the rule
on the ground that it lacks adequate support in the record. To
invalidate the Commission's order on this ground is, in effect,
to reject the ordinary procedures of notice-and-comment
rulemaking. Informal rulemaking does not necessarily involve
either the creation of a record sufficient to withstand review
under a substantial evidence standard or findings of the kind
most susceptible to judicial review. . . .
The thesis of the majority is untenable in light of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Vermont Yankee . . . . 272
Again, the judicial record indicates conflict in philosophy as to the
proper role of the court in review of informal rulemaking.
Further evidence of this philosophical conflict is found in Batterton
v. Marshall. 273 The Department of Labor failed to employ notice-andcomment procedures in adopting a new method to compute unemployment statistics, and the court held that the agency's action constituted a
rule that was not exempt from APA procedures. 274 Judge Bazelon expressly distinguished Vermont Yankee on the ground that "in the instant
case . . . the sole question is whether DOL employed the minimal proce-

267.

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

any new or more stringent standard" than the established "hard look" standard. [d.
at 451. The court's discussion of the standard relies extensively on traditional preVermont Yankee precedent without addressing the impact of Vermont Yankee. /d.
at 451-54. The case has the air of "business as usual."
685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
See supra text accompanying notes 183-89.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 685 F.2d 459,517,520-40 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore Gas
& Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 2246 (1983).
606 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
[d.
[d. at 983-85 (Robb, J., dissenting).
648 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
[d. at 699-708.
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dural requirements established by statute. . . ."275
This analysis alone seems apparently unremarkable in its relationship to Vermont Yankee. Although it seems consistent, dicta with respect to the possibility of employing the "substantial impact" test to
impose notice and comment in otherwise exempt rulemaking suggests
that the court's analysis strays from the principle, if not the strictly interpreted rule, of Vermont Yankee. As noted above,276 other D.C. Circuit
decisions indicate the demise of the "substantial impact" test as a basis
for imposing additional procedures. In Batterton, Judge Bazelon refuses
to reject it, at least as a means to determine whether the agency action is
of a type that is exempt from the AP A's notice and comment
requirement:
DOL suggests in the instant case that the "substantial impact"
test may put a court in the posture of appearing to require procedures beyond those mandated by statute or voluntarily
adopted by the agency, and in that fashion deviate from the
implications of Vermont Yankee . .. we do not rely on the
"substantial impact" analysis. Nonetheless, we find no reason
to doubt the continued viability of the "substantial impact"
test, as it simply articulates one of the several criteria for evaluating claims of exemption from section 553. 277
If Judge Bazelon were to use the substantial impact test as a means to
find an otherwise exempt rule not exempt, and therefore subject to notice
and comment, he would, in effect, have imposed procedures upon the
agency - procedures that the agency had found unnecessary. Thus, the
idea of imposing procedures in rulemaking obviously is not dead in all
quarters.
One of the more celebrated examples of judicial imposition of nonstatutory requirements in informal rulemaking is in the area of ex parte
contacts. Under the APA, ex parte communications that are relevant to
the merits of a rule between interested persons outside an agency and the
decisionmakers within the agency are prohibited. If such communications nevertheless occur, they must be placed on the public record. 278
This provision does not, however, apply to informal rulemaking; it applies only in cases of formal adjudication and formal rulemaking. 279 That
Congress did not apply this section to informal rulemaking is consistent
with traditional notions of rulemaking procedure under which ex parte
contacts had been an accepted and a lawful practice. 280
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 707.
See supra text accompanying notes 198-208.
Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 708-09 n.83 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1982).
The procedures for formal rulemaking, that is, rulemaking "on the record after an
opportunity for an agency hearing," 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982), and for formal adjudication, 5 U.S.c. § 554 (1982), are set forth in 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (1982).
280. Action for Children's Television, Inc. v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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The legitimacy of ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking was altered dramatically in 1977. In Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,281 the D.C.
Circuit concluded:
Once a notice of proposed rulemaking has been issued. . . any
agency official or employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional process of the rulemaking proceeding should 'refus[e] to discuss matters relating to
the disposition of a [rulemaking proceeding] with any interested private party, or an attorney or agent for any such party,
prior to the [agency's] decision' . . . . If ex parte contacts
nonetheless occur, we think that any written document or a
summary of any oral communication must be placed in the
public file established for each rulemaking docket immediately
after the communication is received so that interested parties
may comment thereon. 282
The court based its conclusion on several considerations, including the
need for and "benefit of adversarial discussion among the parties, "283
"the inconsistency of secrecy with fundamental notions of fairness implicit in due process and with the ideal of reasoned decisionmaking on
the merits which undergirds all of our administrative law,"284 and the
fear of "one administrative record for the public and this court and another for the Commission and those 'in the know'. "285
The implications of the case were immediately questioned in the
D.C. Circuit itself. It has been suggested that Home Box Office was only
"momentarily the law of the D.C. Circuit"286 as a consequence of Action
for Children's Television, Inc. v. FCC.287 Although the latter did not
overrule Home Box Office, it refused to apply it retroactively "inasmuch
as it constitutes a clear departure from established law"288 suggested that
Home Box Office might be limited to rulemaking requiring "resolution of
conflicting private claims to a valuable privilege,"289 and perhaps confined it to ex parte contacts when "it appears from the administrative
record under review that they may have materially influenced the action
ultimately taken. "290
Vermont Yankee placed the continuing vitality of Home Box Office
in even greater doubt. Some commentators thought it was dead,291 some
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
[d. at 57 (citation omitted).
[d. at 55.
[d. at 56.
[d. at 54.
1 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 533 (1978).
564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
[d. at 474.
[d. at 476.
[d.
E.g., Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White
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thought the contrary,292 and some were understandably uncertain. 293
The D.C. Circuit's response has been mixed. In Sierra Club v. Costle,294
the court refused to extend Home Box Office, and thus declined to invalidate an EPA rule that resulted from a proceeding which included ex
parte contacts with individuals outside the agency after the close of the
comment period. 295 In Iowa State Commerce Commission v. Office of
Federal Inspector,296 the court distinguished Home Box Office on its
facts, and added that the ex parte contacts at issue "did not violate basic
tenets of fairness."297 In United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall,298
the court was not willing to extend Home Box Office to "apply the ban
on ex parte contacts to agency staff" dealings with OSHA decisionmakers in developing a standard for lead in the workplace. 299 Yet
none of these cases expressly overruled Home Box Office; other decisions
of the D.C. Circuit reveal that it is not likely to do so.
United States Lines, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commission 3°O concerned an order approving an amendment and extension of a joint service
agreement between two water common carriers. 301 A competing shipper,
United States Lines, petitioned for review and the D.C. Circuit remanded. One issue was the propriety of "secret ex parte contacts [that]
were employed both to introduce new arguments and positions and to
respond to and rebut arguments which protestant USL made in its public
filings."302
Although the underlying statute provided for notice and a hearing,
the court concluded that the hearing need not be formal and treated the
FMC's decision as informal adjudication. 303 Thus, the proceeding was

292.

293.

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

House, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 943, 976-78 (1980) (Home Box Office would seem to
"fly in the face" of Vermont Yankee).
See, e.g., Preston, A Right of Rebuttal in Informal Rulemaking: May Courts Impose
Procedures to Ensure Rebuttal of Ex Parte Communications and Information Derived from Agency Files After Vermont Yankee?, 32 AD. L. REV. 621, 625 (1982);
Note, Administrative Law - Administrative Procedure - Notice and Comment
Rulemaking, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 314, 331-32 (it is suggested that Home Box Office
may survive because its due process underpinnings fall within Vermont Yankee's
"constitutional constraints" exception).
E.g., Gellhom & Robinson, Rulemaking "Due Process'~' An Inconclusive Dialogue,
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 201, 214-15 (1981) ("The Supreme Court's decision in Vermont
Yankee, invalidating judicial imposition of special procedures on agency rulemaking, compounds the uncertainty, especially inasmuch as the decision itself has an
unclear future.").
657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Id. at 400-03.
730 F.2d 1566, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1576.
647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
Id. at 1214. The majority also distinguished Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91,
126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1978), in which it had intimated that it might, in an appropriate
case in the future, bar such ex parte contacts. 647 F.2d at 1215-16.
584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Id.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 526, 536-37.
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not subject to the AP A's express statutory prohibition of ex parte contacts in formal rulemaking and adjudication. Nevertheless, the court
noted "the inconsistency of secret ex parte contacts with the notion of a
fair hearing and with the principles of fairness implicit in due process
. . . . "304 This denial of an opportunity for United States Lines to participate effectively in the proceeding was found "to do violence not only
to [the underlying statute] but to the basic fairness concept of due process
as well."305 In addition, the court found that the secret contacts "foreclose[d] effective judicial review of the agency's final decision according
to the arbitrary and capricious standard of the Administrative Procedure
Act."306
In reaching this result, the court made clear its recognition that
Home Box Office involved informal rulemaking and not informal adjudication as in this case. 307 The court's purpose, however, was not to distinguish Home Box Office; the point was but one step on the path to
explaining why the principles of Home Box Office were relevant here. It
said, "Moreover, however we label the proceedings involved here and in
our earlier cases the common theme remains: that ex parte communications and agency secrecy as to their substance and existence serve effectively to deprive the public of the right to participate meaningfully in the
decisionmaking process. "308
On the relationship between its findings and Vermont Yankee, the
court observed:
Nor is our conclusion here inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Vermont Yankee. . ..
The freedom of administrative agencies to fashion their
own procedures recognized in Vermont Yankee, however, does
not encompass freedom to ignore statutory requirements. . . .
Nor does Vermont Yankee provide a basis for agency procedures or practices which effectively foreclose judicial review
where, as here, such review is provided for by statute. Nothing
in that decision calls into question the well established principle, found in the Administrative Procedure Act and in the decisions of the Supreme Court, that the court is required to
conduct a "searching and careful" inquiry to determine
whether agency action is arbitrary or capricious, or, in appropriate cases, supported by substantial evidence. . . .309
The anomaly, of course, is that if it is so obvious that the APA does not
preclude, and may even require this result, what is one to make of the
extensive provision on ex parte contacts that Congress put in the AP A,
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

539.
541.
541-42.
539.
540.
542.
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and limited to formal rulemaking and formal adjudication?310
Whether Home Box Office and its progeny should have survived
Vermont Yankee remains an issue because they have survived. The commentators generally recognize this;3!! the D.C. Circuit has as well. In
United Steelworkers of America, Inc. v. Marshall,3!2 for example, it noted
that, in Home Box Office, the court went beyond the strict terms of the
AP A and the underlying statute to ban ex parte contacts and that this
position was reaffirmed in United States Lines. 313 It seems that the court
will do no more than distinguish Home Box Office in some cases,3!4 while
extending it in others.
In his commentary before joining the bench, Judge Scalia roundly
criticized the decision in United States Lines, believing that it "fiout[ed]
the Supreme Court's guidance in Vermont Yankee . . . ., cites repeatedly . . . a virtual rogue's gallery of . . . the swashbuckling D.C. Circuit
opinions . . . ," and is "cause for serious professional concern."3!5
Nothing in the subsequent judicial record suggests reason for him to conclude otherwise today.3!6
IV.

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFICACY OF SUPREME
COURT LEADERSHIP IN JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING
Predictions that Vermont Yankee would not take an important place

310. National Small Shipments Traffic Conference v. ICC, 590 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
considered the ex parte contact issue in connection with an ICC investigation proceeding which it characterized as "informal rulemaking" with the additional statutory requirement of a non-adjudicatory hearing. Id. at 350. It found "such contacts
. . . offensive in two fundamental respects: (1) they violate the basic fairness of a
hearing which ostensibly assures the public a right to participate in agency decisionmaking, and (2) they foreclose effective judicial review of the agency's final decision." Id. at 351. It turned to Home Box Office and u.s. Lines for support, id. at
351 n.49, and cited the latter in placing Vermont Yankee to the side. Id. at 351 n.46.
311. Davis, Administrative Common Law and the Vermont Yankee Opinion, 1980 UTAH
L. REV. 3, 16; DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257, 316-18 (1979); Preston, supra note 292, at 625; Stewart,
supra note 24, at 1816-17 n.49; cf Verkuil, supra note 291, at 978 (Verkuil suggests
that U.S. Lines may be consistent with Vermont Yankee because it concerned informal adjudication and the APA ignores that form of administrative action, whereas
Home Box Office involves informal rulemaking, which is expressly covered by the
APA, thus making Home Box Office inconsistent with Vermont Yankee).
312. 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 913 (1981).
313. Id. at 1214.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 294-98.
315. Scalia, supra note 38, at 397-99.
316. Cf Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct.
3532 (1984). The circuit court found the Food and Drug Administration arbitrary
and capricious in declining to exercise its enforcement jurisdiction to consider assertions that use of certain drugs for capital punishment violated the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Judge Scalia, in dissent, said that the majority's imposition of a reasons requirement was "one of those novel procedural requirements we
have been told not to invent. Vermont Yankee . . . . " Id. at 1198 n.6 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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in administrative law were incorrect. The frequency with which the
lower federal courts have turned to it in the past six years alone demonstrates this. Less clear is whether the case has had the effects which the
Supreme Court intended.
If, as does seem reasonably clear, the unanimous Court intended to
rein in judicial activism in review of informal rulemaking in general, and
the imposition of additional procedures in informal rulemaking in particular, the results are inconclusive. It has been generally effective where
leadership was probably least needed - in the district courts and the
courts of appeals other than the D.C. Circuit. In the latter, where the
consensus seems to be that the leadership was most needed, the efficacy
of the Court's leadership is more modest. Evidence of resistance to Vermont Yankee is both quantitatively and qualitatively greater in the D.C.
Circuit than elsewhere in the lower federal judiciary.
Overall, in the area of informal rulemaking, the leadership of the
Court has been moderately effective. To the extent that Vermont Yankee's lead has been ineffective in establishing the intended judicial role in
the review of rulemaking, the reason may be the ambiguities of the decision itself as much as perceived arrogance or intransigence in the lower
federal judiciary. Vermont Yankee left open not only the exceptions for
constitutional contraints or extremely compelling circumstances, but also
the possibility of remands when "the challenged rule finds [in]sufficient
justification in the administrative proceedings that it should be upheld by
the reviewing court."317 Although the exceptions do not appear to have
been exploited to circumvent the Supreme Court's basic position, the exigencies of judicial review have been invoked in some cases with that
effect. 318
If the Supreme Court is inclined to implement the temper of Vermont Yankee effectively and fully, it must develop these issues in future
cases. It is not further refinement of the exceptions for constitutional
constraints or extremely compelling circumstances that is needed, however, as much as development of the precise nature of the judiciary's role
in judicial review of informal rulemaking. Otherwise, the plausible and
readily accessible "gap" will remain available to courts inclined to resist
Vermont Yankee. As has been noted, refinement, by the Supreme Court,
of the principles of Vermont Yankee has been limited to date. 319
Where the leadership of Vermont Yankee perhaps has been most
effective is in areas where it was least intended, if at all - in administrative proceedings other than informal rulemaking. In courts throughout
the lower federal judiciary, the case has been cited frequently in the context of adjudicatory proceedings. Typically these courts have focused on
Vermont Yankee's statement that procedures beyond those mandated by
317. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 549 (1978).
318. See supra text accompanying notes 151-58 & 273-80.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 41-55.
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statute are to be left to the discretion of the agencies, absent constitutional constraints or extremely compelling circumstances. The clear impression is that it has had impact in restraining judicial activism in
review of administrative adjudication. The clear question is whether this
was intended by the Supreme Court.
One important consideration that influenced the Supreme Court,
and caused it to stress that the circumstances justifying its position that
exceptions would be "extremely rare,"320 was its fear that
if courts continually review agency proceedings to determine
whether the agency employed procedures which were, in the
court's opinion, perfectly tailored to reach what the court perceives to be the "best" or "correct" result, judicial review
would be totally unpredictable. And the agencies, operating
under this vague injunction to employ the "best" procedures
and facing the threat of reversal if they did not, would undoubtedly adopt full adjudicatory procedures in every instance. Not
only would this totally disrupt the statutory scheme, through
which Congress enacted "a formula upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest. . ., but all the inherent advantages of informal rulemaking would be totally
lost. 321
The Court was not addressing the addition of procedural requirements in
adjudication. There is no indication that it desired to preserve any idea
of inherent advantages of informal adjudication. Yet the invocation of
Vermont Yankee in such cases may have that unintended effect.
This would not be especially disquieting were it not for the added
dimension of the "consitutional constraints" exception that accompanies
the call for judicial restraint. In rulemaking, the idea that due process is
relevant only in the unusual case is traditional and unremarkable. As the
D.C. Circuit observed in one case citing Vermont Yankee, "when a proceeding is classified as rulemaking, due process ordinarily does not demand procedures more rigorous than those provided by Congress."322 It
is quite correct then, to consider the "constitutional constraints" exception an "extremely rare" occurrence. In contrast, there is nothing "extremely rare" in an active concept of due process in administrative
adjudication, formal or informal.
The frequent adoption of the principles of Vermont Yankee in adjudication cases carries with it the suspicion that the effect may be to impede the rigor of constitutional analysis in cases in which traditional
notions of due process are both legitimate and due. This can be alleviated in two ways. The lower federal judiciary shoula be alert to the fact
320. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978).
321. [d. at 546-47 (emphasis added).
322. Association of Nat'} Advertisers, Inc. v. FfC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1165-66 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
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that Vermont Yankee focused on added procedures in rulemaking and
not in adjudication; thus, it should not be taken as an added impediment
to the imposition of additional procedures in adjudication on constitutional grounds. 323 Second, the Supreme Court should clarify its stand on
the relationship between Vermont Yankee and administrative action beyond the sphere of administrative rulemaking.
Consequently, in both rulemaking and adjudication, the lower federal judiciary needs further guidance from the Supreme Court on the
meaning of Vermont Yankee. One hopes that it will be forthcoming in
the not too distant future.

323. Historic Green Springs, Inc. v. Bergland, 497 F. Supp. 839, 851-56 (E.D. Va. 1981),
provides'an example of an informal adjudication in which a court cognizant of Vermont Yankee was nonetheless uninhibited in its due process analysis.

